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Human error has been identified as the major contributor in many severe aviation 
mishaps, even for accidents involving unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The 
Department of Defense (DOD) has used the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) taxonomy successfully for ten years to discover the human error in UA 
mishaps. It is important not to ignore the indisputable human presence in UA and the 
possible human-related causal factors in UA mishaps so we might be better able to reduce 
and prevent possible incidents. HFACS with its four main and 19 subcategories is a 
useful framework for identifying which factors have arisen historically, and which of 
them should have priority. 
The results of this study reveals that among 287 causal factors attributed to 68 
accidents, 65 percent of the factors were associated with humans. Moreover, this study 
also discloses that the rater who categorizes the factors can differently observe, 
understand, and interpret the findings of mishap investigation; thus, human error may 
even impact the categorization phase due to the rater’s perception. The research 
concluded that even though HFACS carried out its functionality well, further study is 
needed to conduct intense statistical analysis with unlimited data and to validate HFACS 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For several years, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (also known as drones), 
though unpopular, have been improving. They are regarded as a fundamental part of 
major tactical and strategic systems on the modern battlefield (Miller, 2013). The 
increasing popularity of UAVs as a force multiplier in active combat, however, has 
increased the frequency of UAV accidents, and this is no less true in the Turkish Armed 
Forces. UAVs are inherently similar to manned aircraft, yet mishaps involving UAVs 
differ significantly from manned aviation accidents. Such unmanned mishaps were 
regarded as ground accidents within the U.S. Army in the past. However, they are now 
considered as having both a ground and aviation component. (Tvaryanas, Thompson, & 
Constable, 2005). “Recent research demonstrates that both aviation and ground accidents 
have three major components: human, materiel, and environmental factors” (Manning, 
Rash, LeDuc, Noback, & McKeon, 2004, p. 3). Among them, human-related factors are 
an important cause for the increase in the frequency of UAV accidents.  
Chapter I introduces the study. First, we discuss the increasing popularity of 
UAVs and emerging mishap rates associated with that trend. Second, we provide a brief 
summary of the goals of our study on this topic. Third, we pose several research 
questions on the topic, discuss the importance of UAVs, and address the need to 
minimize accident rates. Finally, we outline our research scope and conclude with a 
project overview.   
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
UAVs are widely used in many fields such as military and intelligence 
(reconnaissance and close combat support); national security (policing and border patrol); 
and environmental, emergency response, and infrastructure (storm and weather 
monitoring, search and rescue, and damage assessment in natural disasters) (Deloitte, 





• Investigate UAV mishaps, analyzing each one for causal factors. 
• Analyze the effects and the results of some specific UAV accident cases 
and their data in the U.S. military units to understand the effect of human 
factors.  
• Minimize the possibility of UAV accidents that Turkey may confront 
within the near future, while increasing the number of UAVs in the 
Turkish Armed Forces inventory. 
• Demonstrate the importance of human components in the operation of 
unmanned aircraft systems by means of HFACS. 
• Analyze sample cases to determine the possible rating/coding 
discrepancies during investigation process by using HFACS. 
The issues listed above will help us to identify the role of human factors in UAV 
accidents and lead us to seek ways to prevent from human-caused mishaps. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To better understand human causal factors in UAV accidents, and to find ways to 
prevent accidents stemming from human errors, we will focus on the following research 
questions. 
• What common factors are related to humans in the U.S. Navy UAV 
accidents, how can the discovery of these factors shape the future 
applications of safety measures?  
• What kind of analytic approach can be used to analyze human factors on 
UAV accidents? 
• Is there any coding discrepancy among rater/mishap investigators while 
interpreting the findings of causal factors UAS accidents?  
• How can Turkish Armed Forces benefit from the findings about the role of 
human factors in UAV mishaps? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE 
Despite the fact that UAVs have only recently received public attention, they have 
a long history. The history of UAVs extends to the beginning of aerial warfare and the 




aircraft was Austria in the mid-19th century. “The aircraft attacked the Italian city Venice 
by using balloons laden with explosives.” (Miller, 2013, p. 1). Even if balloons cannot be 
considered the pure ancestors of the UAV; the concept was promising enough to inspire 
flying unmanned vehicles in the battlefield after the invention of the winged aircraft 
(Miller, 2013).  
The inventory of UAVs has been on the rise in most military services in recent 
years, and flying unmanned systems is not without risks. Moreover, despite advantages 
over conventional manned aircraft in decreasing human loss, unmanned flying requires 
significant financial resources to maintain continuous operations. Given the popularity 
and increase in UAVs, crashes have been reported worldwide. Causes for such accidents 
are related to material, environmental, and human factors and many studies have been 
conducted to reduce the effects caused by these factors. Of importance are the human 
factors. Our argument is that if we place greater emphasis on the human factors, we have 
a greater chance of mitigating the risks and challenges associated with human error in 
mishaps. In addition to the quality of training, crew synergy, and situational awareness, 
human factors include fatigue and problems associated with workload and adaptation 
(Manning et al., 2004). It is very important to know human-related causal factors to 
reduce costs and increase mission effectiveness. Being aware of the abilities of the 
system and tackling the hindrances to its pace of technological progress, will widen the 
fields of UAV usage and effectiveness.  
D. RESEARCH SCOPE 
UAVs can be categorized in terms of their functions such as reconnaissance, 
combat, and logistics, or by their range and altitude such as NATO type 10,000 ft. (3,000 
m) altitude, up to 50 km range, Tactical 18,000 ft. (5,500 m) altitude, about 160 km 
range,  medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) up to 30,000 ft. (9,000 m) and range 
over 200 km and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) over 30,000 ft. (9,100 m) and 
indefinite range (CNBC, 2014). This project focuses on the MALE type UAVs because 
of Turkey`s advancements in this type. A medium-altitude long-endurance UAV (MALE 




on the forefront in the UAV market. The U.S., South Africa, Israel, and Turkey are the 
leading countries in this market. 
A limited number of foreign-made UAVs have been used in Turkey for a long 
time. The first domestically produced Anka, medium-altitude, long-endurance class UAV 
is expected to be ready in 2016. All the drone systems will be delivered to the Turkish 
Armed Forces by 2018 (Raufoglu, 2014). Additionally, two other national tactical drone 
programs are proceeding at high speed. Procurement officials expect deliveries of both 
the Bayraktar and the Karayel UAVs to begin in 2014 (Bekdil, 2014). With these 
programs, Turkey will have a significant number of UAVs in the near future. To manage 
the increasing number of UAVs efficiently in the Turkish Armed Forces, an analysis of 
previous accidents can offer feedback to decrease high costs arising from these accidents.   
This project discusses human causal factors on UAV accidents by using a 
systematic approach called Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). 
Results will help identify the mishaps that may occur with an increase in the number of 
UAVs in Turkey, and will provide insight for better optimized and more effective UAV 
flights. 
E. PROJECT OVERVIEW  
The project will be organized into six chapters. Chapter I will be the introduction. 
It will describe the problem and objectives of the analysis. Chapter II will define some 
terms inherent to the system and discuss the literature review of UAV accidents. It will 
also focus on operational fields and the classification of UAVs. Chapter III will provide 
information about the development of HFACS and its application in aviation. Chapter IV 
will analyze the data gathered about UAV accidents and compare the findings to reach a 
final decision on the role of human beings in the mishaps. Chapter V will analyze sample 
case studies to identify possible categorizing discrepancies among rater / mishap 
investigators during interpretation of the UAS accident findings. Finally, Chapter VI 
summarizes the overall findings and presents recommendations for handling the rise of 




II. UAS OVERVIEW AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
UAS technology has progressed during the past several decades. Military 
organizations around the world have been using them increasingly for the last 10 years 
(Lum & Waggoner, 2011). In the United States, from 2005 to 2011, the increase in UAV 
usage is approximately six-fold; about 100,000 flight hours to 600,000 in the Department 
of Defense (DOD). At the same time, the DOD boosted its UAS budget from $1.5 billion 
in 2005 to $6 billion in 2012 (Waraich, Mazzuchi, Sarkani, & Rico, 2013). Some 
researchers have determined that there are more than 10,000 UASs flying world at any 
given time. In 2010 in Afghanistan and Iraq, at least 38 UASs were in the air 
continuously (Waraich et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the unmanned aircraft category is quite diverse. Aircrafts’ 
manufacturing range changes in size from small, which are capable of being hand-
launched to large like transport aircraft, in weight from a few kilograms to more than 
12,000 kg. They have different altitude and endurance capabilities as well as fixed and 
rotary wing types (Hayhurst, Maddalon, Miner, DeWalt, & McCormick, 2006).  
With an increase in usage and diversity of unmanned aircraft, there is also brings 
an increase in mishaps and accident rates. We review studies that have sought to find the 
causes of these mishaps and accidents. Before reviewing the literature though, it is 
necessary to know the terminology, elements, types, application areas, and advantages of 
UAVs as well as people’s perception about UAVs. Information provided here will help 
familiarize the reader to unmanned aircraft systems.  
B. DEFINITION 
Nowadays, unmanned systems and the terminology associated with their 
development are changing rapidly. Many terms are used to refer to unmanned aircraft 
systems such as unmanned aircraft (UA), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and 




remotely piloted aircraft that could carry miscellaneous payloads like Electro-Optical/
Infrared (EO/IR) cameras, Synthetic-Aperture Radars (SAR), Electronic Warfare (EW) 
and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). These types of payloads have helped missions to be 
more effective and convenient. Then, this view changed as authorities realized that the 
aircraft is not the only element in the unmanned aircraft system. Other elements are also 
equally important for the system’s sustainability and persistence. 
The FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) describes UAS and UA with the 
following definitions: 
A UAS is the unmanned aircraft and all of the associated support 
equipment, control station, data links, telemetry, communications and 
navigation equipment, etc., necessary to operate the unmanned aircraft 
(FAA, 2014). 
The UA is the flying portion of the system, flown by a pilot via a ground 
control system, or autonomously through use of an on-board computer, 
communication links and any additional equipment that is necessary for 
the UA to operate safely. The FAA issues an experimental airworthiness 
certificate for the entire system, not just the flying portion of the system 
(FAA, 2014).   
C. WHAT COMPRISES AN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS)? 
Both civilian and military unmanned aircraft systems include an unmanned 
aircraft, the human element (UAV operator, payload operator, flight technician), payload 
(EO/IR, infrared camera), control elements (autopilot and ground control stations), and 
data link communication (line-of-sight, satellite). Additionally, a military UAS may also 
include some specific elements such as a weapons system platform and some military 
related payloads such as SAR, EW, and SIGINT. Figure 1 (Barnhart, 2012) illustrates the 
various elements that contribute to a UAS. 
Although it is sometimes ignored, the human element is the most prominent factor 
in this complex system because it is the integral piece and is necessary for running the 
UAS. Without the human element, it is impossible to handle emergency situations, 





Figure 1.  Elements of unmanned aircraft system (from Barnhart, 2012) 
1. Human Element  
In unmanned aircraft systems, the human element involves crew members, 
maintenance technicians, and those who assess video and images (generally intelligence 
analysts and decision makers). We will focus on the flight crew to analyze UA accidents. 
UAS crews generally consist of UA operators and payload operators, but in some 
countries like Turkey, Control Station (CS) technicians also serve as crew members 
during all phases of the flight. We define each crew member’s role here, and provide 
examples of their duties (Hayhurst et al., 2006). Figure 2 shows UV operator and Payload 
operator performing their task during operation. 
UA operators: The person who operates the UA from the engine fire up to engine 
shut down. UA operator is the main part of the UAS flight crew. The UAV operator plans 
the flight in advance, and executes the flight operation. He performs preflight, in-flight, 
post-flight checks and procedures, and he performs the take-off and landing from runway 
by maintaining contact with tower and Air Traffic Control. Moreover he performs the 
emergency procedures while a malfunction or an abnormal issue occurs. He should be 
ready for the dynamic replanning when it is needed. Furthermore he also provides 





Payload operator: This individual operates the payload when the UA is on the 
ground, at the time of takeoff and landing, and in all phases of flight operations. The 
payload operator is an indispensable part of the UAS flight crew, who also assists the 
UAV operator/Pilot in Command (PIC) by reading the checklist and helping in 
emergency situations. Furthermore, he attends the briefing, mission planning, mission 
execution, and debriefing phases with the UAV operator and the CS technician. 
CS Technician: The control station (CS) technician performs the preflight and 
post-flight checks, executes the required procedures of CS to maintain UA functionality 
during the flight. In some structures, a CS technician works as a part of the maintenance 
technician crew. CS technician optimally work within the flight crew team, because they 
are capable of handling the CS emergencies quickly, and are able to attain correct 
solutions more efficiently during most in-flight emergency cases.     
 
Figure 2.  UV operator and payload operator in GCS during mission 




2. Payload Element  
Payload is equipment a UA carries during the flight that is necessary to 
accomplish the mission. There are various types of payloads that are mounted according 
to the mission type. It is almost impossible to see a flying UA without a payload, with the 
exception of some test and training flights. Quality of the payload directly affects mission 
quality. Furthermore, payload and endurance of the UA has an inverse ratio; increasing 
the payload size and weight requires eliminating some amount of fuel, which reduces the 
range and endurance of the UA. Figure 3 illustrates EO/IR Payload of Heron type UA.  
 
Figure 3.  EO/IR payload (from Defense-Update, 2009) 
3. Communication/Datalink Element  
The UA is controlled from the ground control station by line of sight (LOS), relay 
and/or satellite communication (SATCOM) data link. LOS is used for low range 
distances, while relay and SATCOM help to extend the range and also are good for low 
altitude flights or flights in mountainous areas. A datalink element is necessary for 
communication between the UA and the ground control station (GCS). Commands to the 
UA, payload and sensors send via uplink, while real time information from sensors, 




4. Control Element 
a. Autopilot 
The autopilot function provides self-control of the aircraft during takeoff, landing, 
and desired flight phases when a UA operator does not have control on the UA. Using 
autopilot reduces the error ratio of a UA operator during two critical times: landing and 
takeoff.  
b. Control Station 
CS is a control center of UA, such as a cockpit in an manned aircraft. Mission 
planning, mission execution, and data manipulation can be performed, and most 
importantly, UA is operated/remotely piloted from the control station. A CS can be 
mobile or stationary (Anderson, 2002). The CS for UAs is generally deployed on the 
ground, on the deck of a ship, or possibly in an airplane (Austin, 2010). Choosing the 
equipment, and control and monitor tools is very important for the crew members. With 
well-designed CS and user-friendly equipment, missions can be performed more 
efficiently and conveniently. Figure 4 shows a ground control station from whence 
operators monitor UAs.    
 





5. Launch and Recovery Element 
There are several launch and recovery platforms. A UA may take off and land 
vertically from a port that has enough space or horizontally that has enough length of 
runway, or a catapult launching and hand-launching may be used. The latter are used for 
some of the Class-l categorized UAs, but their recovery type is different than their launch 
style. Some of the examples of recovery types include a skid or belly landing, a 
catchment net landing, and parachute landing  (Austin, 2010). Figure 5 shows an ANKA 
type of UAV that uses a runway for takeoff and landing, and a hand-launching type of 
Raven. 
 
Figure 5.  ANKA type of UAV (left) and a hand-launching type of Raven 
(right) (from UAVGLOBAL, 2014; Unmanned Ground, Aerial, Sea and 
Space Systems, 2011). 
D. CLASSIFICATIONS OF UAS  
Today’s unmanned aircrafts are incredibly diverse, including Nanos and giant 
type UAs like the Global Hawk. NATO formed a comprehensive classification to more 
clearly define a suitable standardization.  
NATO identifies the following three categories of UAs based on their weight, 




commander (Ministry of Defence & Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, 2011). 
Table 1 summarizes this classification scheme. 
Class I: This class of UAS is generally man-portable, hand-launched and operated 
by an individual controller, and used for small troop protection and base security. 
Moreover, they have a range of less than 50 km, and are typically used at low altitudes. 
Infrastructure is not needed for this class.  
Class II: Many of these medium-sized unmanned aircrafts can be launched from a 
platform, but some require a runway for takeoff and landing. Normally, they have a range 
between 50 km and 200 km, and their tactical missions are performed at medium altitude.  
Class III: Fixed-wing UAS require runways for launch and recovery, as well as 
greater logistical support and infrastructure. Normally, they have a range beyond 200 km, 
and are used for strategic and operational missions at high altitude.  
Table 1.   Unmanned Aircraft Classification Guide (from Great Britain 







This thesis focuses primarily on MALE types of UASs, which fly at an altitude of 
up to 45,000 ft. above ground level (AGL) during most operational duties. These UASs 
belong to class III, and generally use SATCOM data links.  
Definitions proliferate with technological developments, and now include some 
new categories that should be considered. Austin (2010) describes Nano Air Vehicles 
(NAV) in the following manner. 
NAV - Nano Air Vehicles: These are proposed to be of the size of 
sycamore seeds and used in swarms for purposes such as radar confusion 
or conceivably, if camera, propulsion, and control sub-systems can be 
made small enough for ultra-short range surveillance. 
According to Dalamagkidis, Valavanis & Piegl (2008), it is also possible to 
classify UA by their level of autonomy. They described remotely piloted as a pilot who 
has a pilot certificate controls the system remotely. They described remotely operated as 
a trained operator who gives the significant commands, such as go waypoints, hold, FTC 
(fly to coordinate), and track target. He monitors the performance of the UA. Finally, 
they described fully autonomous as the system itself does the main tasks and is able to 
analyze how to complete them. They noted that the UA operator “can monitor its 
malfunction status and take urgent actions after the occurrence of faults” (Dalamagkidis 
et al. p. 722). 
E. APPLICATIONS OF UAVS 
Unmanned aircraft systems perform many duties both in the military and civilian 
sectors, but most significant success come with military applications. Although there are 
lots of controversies using UAVs in the same airspace with manned aircrafts due to 
safety, it is possible to see many applications in both military and civilian sides. Disaster 
response, public safety, commercial deliveries, meteorological investigations, traffic 
monitoring, agricultural operations, fire-monitoring support and coordination, 
environmental and wildlife surveying, fisheries management, monitoring water pipelines, 
power plants, and utilities are examples of the most common civilian UAS application 




Military Applications: Many duties related with military and intelligence can be 
performed by UAVs. The following list displays the most common and well-known 
military applications for UAVs (Gupta, Ghonge &  Jawandhiya, 2013).  
• Reconnaissance and Surveillance of enemy activity 
• SAR 
• Deception operations 
• Maritime operations (Naval fire support, over the horizon targeting, anti-
ship missile defense, ship classification) 
• Radar system jamming and termination 
• Meteorology missions 
• Route and landing reconnaissance support 
• Adjustment of indirect fire and Close Air Support (CAS) 
• Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 
• Radio and data relay 
• Monitoring of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) contamination 
• Location and destruction of land mines 
• Target designation and monitoring 
F. WHY USE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT?  
The use of unmanned aircraft systems in the military continues to grow at a rapid 
pace. Significant increases have occurred during the past decade of unmanned aircraft 
systems, primarily in ISR missions. In these missions the authorities and the decision 
makers understand that unmanned systems provide clear views to give correct decisions, 
and for the pilot it is necessary for reducing human workload, improving mission 
efficiency and effectiveness, minimizing the risk, and reducing the overall cost (United 





Glade (2000) indicates the following benefits that make the UAS indispensable to 
military forces. 
• UAS provide real-time information from battlefield and operation areas so 
that commanders and decision makers can easily determine the target and 
the final actions, such as whether the target is the right target, whether the 
target should be destroyed.      
• UAS overcome human physical limitations. Acceleration (g), forces, and 
fatigue are not problems or considerations for the pilot.  
• UAVs can be more maneuverable than manned aircraft and the endurance 
and effectiveness of the mission increases with UAVs. Although UAVs 
fly more than manned aircrafts, they consume less fuel (cost-effective).  
• While the UA is flying, crew members can change after they accomplish 
their maximum flight time without hampering the mission.   
• UAS provide operations safety to personnel, which are a first priority to 
armed forces and the public. 
2. Roles 
UAVs are necessary for today’s world because, in addition to the advantages 
above, UAS are also better suited for some of the roles such as dull, dirty, dangerous, and 
covert missions than manned aircraft are. These roles are described below. 
(1) Dull Roles 
Extended surveillance can be very difficult and considered a dulling experience 
for aircrew. When they are observing a target for many hours without a break, they may 
often lose concentration (Austin, 2010) and become complacent. Furthermore, routine 
and passionless tasks, such as surveillance tasks flying over fixed targets, anti-piracy 
operations, and responding to communications relay, may be difficult and pointless for 
manned aircrafts, because these tasks require a greater degree of human oversight (Great 





(2) Dirty Roles 
Observing an area for nuclear or chemical contamination is a risky and dangerous 
for crew who operate a manned aircraft. UASs were employed in dirty roles between the 
years of 1946–1948. UASs flew into nuclear clouds to assess the damage after 
detonation. Such missions were too dangerous and harmful for humans (Austin, 2010; 
Gupta et al., 2013). In the civilian sector, unmanned aircraft may be used for 
reconnaissance of natural disasters, such as forest fires where smoke and flame could be 
harmful to the people involved (Great Britain et al., 2011). In these missions, UASs use 
could be intentionally terminated in a safe area once the task has been completed.  
(3) Dangerous Roles 
Dangerous roles can be defined as those tasks performed by a manned aircraft 
pilot that can cause death or bodily injury. For instance, in military operations, it is 
difficult and risky for a manned aircraft to penetrate heavily-defended enemy territories 
where reconnaissance and surveillance are necessary. Due to the lower speed and smaller 
size of the UAS, it is challenging to detect them via radar systems (Austin, 2010). 
(4) Covert Roles 
Maintaining a low profile and not alerting the enemy are inevitable rules for both 
military and civilian policing operations and UAVs. Using less traceable equipment is 
necessary to maintain these rules. If infringing the foreign country’s airspace is 
necessary, UAS can more easily perform this covert surveillance (Austin, 2010). 
3. Economic Reasons  
UASs have some economic advantages over manned aircrafts. First, although it 
depends on the size of the UA, the manufacturing cost of the UAS is lower than the 
manned aircraft. Secondly, when comparing two aircraft that can be used for the same 
mission role, the cost of a manned aircraft exceeds that of the unmanned aircraft, which 




UA is not a single unit. At least a control station should be needed for the 
operability of the system. If the cost of control station is added to that of UA (UAV + 
UAV control station) the total amount becomes 40–80 percent of manned aircraft cost 
(Austin, 2010). “For example, the Predator unit cost is $4.5 million and the Reaper is $11 
million; however, the unit costs of an F-16 and F-15E, are $18 million and $31 million, 
respectively. A fully-armed F-16 can remain in the target area for 30 minutes before 
having to air refuel. A Reaper UAV, with a comparable weapon load, could orbit the area 
for 18–20 hours.” (Schwing & Army War College, 2007, p. 11). 
Second, UAS have reasonable operating costs if maintenance costs (20 percent of 
manned aircraft cost), fuel costs (5 percent of manned aircraft cost), and inventory cost 
(20 percent of manned aircraft cost) are taken into consideration (Austin, 2010).  
Third, the training costs are low, and the training period takes approximately 4–7 
months, compared with the expensive and 2–3 year training for manned aircrafts. The 
U.S. Air Force spends more than $2.6 million to train a fighter pilot, but only $135,000 
for a UAV operator (Ricks, 2010).  
G. FALLACIES 
It is very hard to accept changes and new implementations. People generally tend 
to resist new systems and insist on the current ones which they are familiar with. In this 
respect, it may not be easy to adapt to new innovations in aviation culture as well and this 
adaption difficulty may cause people to create some fallacies. People may be inclined to 
ignore human influence in UAS. The following fallacies describe mental models that 
must be overcome. 
(1) The “Unmanned” Means No Human Fallacy 
Some may believe no humans are involved in the UASs, but “unmanned” does 
not mean an absence of ‘humans’ in such systems. Indeed, this fallacy ignores the fact 
that people fix malfunctions, operate the UAV, use payloads and monitor the real-time 
videos or images. Moreover, because of this assumption, human factors sometimes are 




(2) The Human Has Been Automated “Out-of the-Loop” Fallacy 
Many people believe that with advanced technology, UASs are highly automated, 
and thus, the risks are low to operators or pilots. In reality, when problems occur, and 
humans must repair equipment, there are still risks to those personnel. Automation does 
not always revise human tasks in a positive way. Many mishaps are associated with 
people who are “out-of-the-loop.” Because in the operation area many things can change 
quickly, operators must be able to easily override the automation tasks from the GCS 
(Cooke, 2006). 
(3) The Just Like Air Traffic Control or Manned Flight Fallacy 
The “Just Like Air Traffic Control” or “Manned Flight Fallacy” comes from the 
idea that one UAV operator can control more than one UA simultaneously similar to air 
traffic controllers and piloted aircraft, and that the UA operators only work is flying the 
aircraft. UAV operations involve more operations than air traffic control and piloted 
aircraft. Maneuvering from one point to another and monitoring the UAV are the basic 
operations of UAS. Using different types of payloads, weapon systems, and dynamic 
planning are additional and distinguishing operations of unmanned aircraft systems 
(Cooke, 2006).   
H. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 1995, limited research and studies have analyzed human causal factors in 
UAS accidents. In many of the projects, Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System’s (HFACS) immature version for the past studies and current version for the 
recent studies were used to understand the reasons behind the accidents and categorize 
them by looking at the reasons. We will explore HFACS in the following chapter in great 
detail and use in our analyses. We summarize here findings from significant and specific 
research studies on UAS accidents. 
Schmidt & Parker (1995), researched 170 unmanned aircraft mishaps between 
1986 and 1993 without using a specific taxonomy, and realized that more than 50 percent 




analyzed the UAV mishaps by using the Unsafe Operations taxonomy that defines three 
main levels of human causal factors, which include unsafe supervision practices, unsafe 
operation conditions and unsafe action committed by the operators, and seventeen 
subcategories.  
Seagle reviewed 203 RQ-2 Pioneer mishaps occurring during the period of 
fiscal years 1986-1997 and found 103 (50.7 percent) mishaps had human 
causal factors and 88 (43.3 percent) mishaps were specifically associated 
with supervisory and aircrew causal factors. Of these 88 mishaps, 64.1 
percent involved unsafe supervision of which known unsafe supervisory 
conditions such as inadequate supervision (e.g., training, policies, and 
leadership) and failure to correct known problems accounted for the 
largest categories. Forty-six percent involved unsafe conditions of 
operators, mostly aeromedical conditions and crew resource management 
(CRM) deficiencies. Fifty-nine percent had unsafe acts with mistakes the 
most common category. Seagle also noted human causal factors varied 
based on environmental conditions, service, and phase of flight. Unsafe 
conditions, particularly aeromedical conditions and CRM failures, were 
more common during embarked versus ashore operations. Known unsafe 
supervisory conditions and CRM failures were associated more with Navy 
than Marine Corps mishaps. The landing phase accounted for 48.9 percent 
of the human related mishaps with CRM failures and mistakes the most 
common factors. (Tvaryanas, Thompson & Constable, 2005, pp. 2–3) 
Seagle recommended improving supervisory practices by understanding the 
existing procedures and implementing new procedures. He also mentioned that the 
leadership training and involvement fortify this. To deal with the unsafe conditions, 
which the operators confront with, Seagle advised to improve aeromedical standards and 
training programs  in CRM (Tvaryanas, Thompson & Constable, 2005). 
Ferguson (1999) created a stochastic model simulation to evaluate human factors 
initiatives in terms of costs incurred on the budget and how ready one is for a mission. He 
used taxonomy of Unsafe Operations while analyzing mishaps.   
He reviewed 228 RQ-2 Pioneer mishaps occurring during the period of 
fiscal years 1986–1998, but limited his analysis of causal factors to the 
period of fiscal years 1993–1998 when mishap reports were standardized 
by the Navy’s aviation safety program. During the latter period, there were 
93 mishaps of which 55 (59.1 percent) had human causal factors. Of these 




conditions of operators, and 63.6 percent unsafe acts. (Tvaryanas et al., 
2005, p. 3) 
His simulation model shows that human causal factors had a significant effect on 
mission readiness and had equal effect on cost as electromechanical mishaps. Ferguson 
concluded that “human factors should be the primary target of intervention strategies and 
recommended the use of simulators, implementation of improved CRM training, and 
stabilization of the UAV career field.” (Tvaryanas et al., 2005, p. 3). 
For the period 1995–2003, Manning, Rash, LeDue, Noback, and McKeon (2004), 
examined and categorized UAS accidents by using two approaches with data that were 
provided by the U.S. Army Risk Management Information. They used two approaches: 
The first approach was a variant on a methodology referred to the Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (Manning et al., 2004, p. 
10).The second analysis approach was based on the accident methodology 
defined in Department of the Army Pamphlet 385–40, “Army accident 
investigation and reporting.” The Army uses a “4-W” approach to accident 
analysis that addresses the sequence of events leading to the accident. The 
“4-Ws” are: 1) When did error/failure/environment factor/injury occur? 2) 
What happened? 3) Why did it happen? 4) What should be done about it? 
Human causal factors are identified during this analysis and broken down 
into five types of failure: Individual failure, leader failure, training failure, 
support failure, and standards failure. (Manning et al., 2004, p. 12) 
Manning et al. (2004) found a correlation between these two approaches. 
According to them, Individual unsafe acts or failures were the most important, 
significant, and widespread human-related causal factor categories (Manning et al., 
2004).  
Asim, Ehsan, and Rafique (2005) also used a HFACS framework to analyze UAV 
accidents for human causal factors. They note that the HFACS framework is extremely 
useful in identification of human causal elements in UAV accidents with its four levels 
that are human errors. These are organizational influences, unsafe supervision, 
preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe acts, and 17 subdivided categories. Moreover, they 




The result of the analysis showed that 32 percent of accidents in a sample of 56 UAV 
accidents are associated with human factors (Asim, et al., 2005). 
Tvaryanas, et al. (2005) came up with a 10-year quantitative analysis by 
reviewing 221 UAS mishaps. They also benefited from HFACS while analyzing these 
accidents. This comprehensive study revealed that 60.2 percent of the accidents involved 
human causal factors. The incidence of mishaps that related to human factor was 62.2 
percent, 79.1 percent, and 39.2 percent for the Navy/Marines Air Force and, Army 
respectively. Another significant result of this study was that the reasons for the latent 
failures differed between the services. “Automation, instrumentation & sensory 
feedback” and “channelized attention” are the general factors of errors primarily 
associated with the Air Force; “Organizational processes that includes procedural 
guidance and publication errors and training deficiencies, overconfidence, and lack of 
crew coordination and communication” are the main factors of errors primarily 
associated with the Army; and “procedural guidance and publication errors, training 
deficiencies, inadequate supervision policies, proficiency, vision restricted by weather 
conditions, control and switches, channelized attention and complacency” are the 
contributor factors primarily associated with the Navy (Tvaryanas, et al., 2005, pp. 6–12). 
Nasir and Shi-Yin (2011) focused on investigating the causal relationship between 
human factors and UAV accidents by using UAV accident data in the U.S. Armed 
Forces. For his statistical data, he used sample data from 56 accidents, including two 
specific types of UAVs: the Hunter (32 accidents), and the Shadow (24 accidents). This 
study of a sampled 56 UAV accidents showed that 15 (47 percent) accidents of the U.S. 
Army Hunter UAV, and 5 (21 percent) of the Shadow UAV system were associated with 
human factors. In this study, specific human factors needed to be taken into account such 
as alerts and alarms, display design deficiencies and situational awareness, procedural 





Our goal is to examine the U.S. Navy UAV accident and hazards, and by 
analyzing the HFACS data for a select set of mishaps. This research may be helpful when 
determining precautions about human error/factors, and providing situational awareness 
for Turkish Armed Forces decision makers to show the importance of humans behind the 
scenes. Although the types of unmanned aircrafts are different between Turkish Armed 
Forces and the U.S. Navy, the causes of human errors are often similar. This can be a 

























III. REVIEW OF THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (HFACS) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Experts in the U.S. Navy established HFACS to investigate and analyze human 
factors in accidents and incidents. Research has shown that HFACS is one of the most 
reliable methods to determine human errors not only in commercial accidents but also in 
military accidents (Wiegmann et al., 2005). HFACS systematically describes the human 
element in the commercial, military, and general aviation (GA) accidents. It enables 
better results in the investigations of the underlying causal factors in the loss of multi-
million dollar projects. Wiegmann and Shappell transformed the Reason’s (1990) Swiss-
cheese model into a framework that evaluates the reduction in the performance of the 
operators leading to aviation accidents. Reason makes a connection between errors and 
failures in the defense of a system. He asserts that despite the fact that each system in an 
organization has its own overlapping defense shields, these shields are not fault free. 
Because active failures and latent failures or conditions may cause holes on the shield just 
like on a ‘Swiss cheese’ (Figure 6). If the holes on each layer of shields line up, error is 
certain. What constitutes the holes in a shield is of critical importance (Reason, 1990).  
 




The framework of HFACS enables the investigators to determine the elements in 
the system that caused an unsafe situation. HFACS focuses on historical data to 
determine trends in UA system failures and human performance, to act proactively and 
reduce the probability of accidents and injury. Active and latent failures intensified in the 
accidents are analyzed and underlying causal factors are exposed in a specific incident 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
B. THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
The HFACS concept relies heavily upon Reason’s (1990) concept of latent and 
active failures, which include: Unsafe Acts, Preconditions of Unsafe Acts, Unsafe 
Supervision, and Organizational Influences. First acts of an operator are analyzed and 
then causes of these acts are determined. After which, supervisory roles are examined to 
determine command and control factors in the accident. Lastly, organizational issues are 
investigated to see the systemic picture (Naval Safety Center, 2012). Moreover, the 
HFACS framework consists of 19 causal factors organized by four levels, as shown in 
Figure 7. Despite the fact that all of the categories are equally important, one can occur in 
one accident, and another in a separate accident. While evaluating the causal factors, to 
achieve the best results, investigators should determine the cause of the given accident 
first, and then analyze the case associated with specific categories. Appendix A presents 
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Figure 7.  DOD HFACS Model (from DOD, 2005). 
1. Acts 
Unsafe acts can be divided into two subcategories: errors and violations. Errors 
constitute most of the accident database and occur because of unintentional mental and 
physical activities of the operators that cause the failure of predetermined results. 
Violations represent the intentional omission of regulations that are required for a secure 























Figure 8.  Subcategories of unsafe acts committed by aircrew (from DOD, 
2005).  
a. Errors 
Errors are non-deliberate actions of operators arising from the failure in their 
capabilities, decision-making processes, and perceptions. 
(1) Skill-Based Errors 
Skill-based errors generally arise from failures in attention, memory, and 
technique. Not being aware of a warning light on the main board while flying close to the 
terrain, is an example of attention failure. Memory failure might include forgetting an 
item on the checklist. Finally, the way an operator controls an UAV, regardless of his 
experience and training, can cause an accident. Being hard on the system and overloading 
the engine with harsh maneuvers represent the failure in technique that can cause 
unintentional consequences (Shappell et al., 2000). 
(2) Judgment and Decision-Making Errors 
Decision errors might be honest mistakes, even if individuals are performing their 
best. Such errors may arise from unintentional lack of proper knowledge and poor 
decision making of the operator. Better plans can be devised in subsequent trials 
(Shappell et al., 2000). 
 Acts  
  
   
 Errors  Violations 
  
    
Skill-Based 
Errors 








(3) Perception Errors 
Perception errors are the result of misconception or misjudgment of the operator 
of the aircraft’s stability, ascent rate, and altitude due to harsh environmental conditions 
(Wiegmann et al., 2005).  
b. Violations 
According to Shappell and Wiegmann, violations are acts of intentional disregard 
for regulations and rules that are created to perform a safe flight mission, and as a result, 
fewer aviation accidents. There are two types of violations: routine violations and 
exceptional violations. Routine violations are the ones that are habitual actions of the 
operators and can be tolerated by the organization. Exceptional violations are ones in 
which operators break a basic rule and depart from authority. These kinds of violations 
may not be tolerated (Shappell et al., 2000).   
2. Preconditions  
Preconditions of unsafe acts enable the investigators to understand the causes of 
accidents. Because unsafe acts of operators constitute fair amount of aviation accidents, 
understanding their causes is fundamental in fighting against these accidents. First, 
preconditions for unsafe acts are divided into three sub-categories: environmental factors, 
condition of individuals, and personal factors. They are then divided into subdivisions for 








a. Environmental Factors 
(1) Physical Environment 
This category includes environmental factors such as lightening, vibration, terrain, 
and weather that affect the abilities of the operator and result in a mishap (DOD, 2005). 
(2) Technological Environment 
Technological environment affects the abilities of an operator by the design of the 
hardware, automation, and the structure of the workspace and may result in a mishap 
(DOD, 2005). 
b. Conditions of Individuals 
(1) Cognitive Factors 
Cognitive factors affect the activities of an operator by decreasing his mental 
abilities and awareness in performing a job (DOD, 2005). 
(2) Psycho-Behavioral Factors 
Being mentally-fit is extremely important for a secure flight in aviation. Negative 
mental conditions severely harm the performance. Loss of situational awareness, fatigue, 
and lack of motivation are only some of the factors that cause adverse mental states 
(Shappell et al., 2000). 
(3) Adverse Physiological States 
Abnormal medical and physiological conditions of the operator can cause the 
failure of the mission or the loss of an aircraft. For example if the operator is spatially 
disoriented and hesitant to rely on flight instrumentation, aircraft can be lost anytime in 
the mission (Wiegemann, Shappell, United States, & Office of Aviation Medicine, 2001). 
(4) Physical/Mental Limitations 
Physical/Mental Limitations are about the lack of aptitude, opportunity, or time to 




capabilities of the operators the results can be disastrous just as in the case of flying in a 
stormy weather (Shappell et al., 2000).   
(5) Perceptual Factors 
Operators may result in an unsafe situation or an accident due to failure in their 
decision-making process. They should be aware of visual, auditory illusion during a 
mission (DOD, 2005).  
c. Personnel Factors 
(1) Coordination, Communication, and Planning  
Lack of coordination, teamwork, and communication among the members creates 
management problems and may result in an unsafe situation. In aviation terms, it is about 
the mismanagement among pilots, air traffic personnel, or the maintenance crew on the 
ground. If there is a problem in the synchronization among these personnel, catastrophic 
results can come forward during missions (Shappell et al., 2000). 
(2) Self-Imposed Stress 
The readiness level of an operator for a mission directly affects the rate of human 
causal factors in an accident. If an operator implements all the rules and regulations to be 
prepared for the mission, he eliminates stress factors that create human errors. Thus, 
pilots/operators should plan their off-duty activities properly in order to be mentally and 
physically fit for the success of the mission. ‘Mission comes first’ is the motto and daily 
activities should be arranged for the realization of that (Shappell et al., 2000).   
3. Supervision 
Not all causal factors stem from the pilot or operator. There are also factors that 
are directly related to supervisory failures (Reason, 1990). These factors can be 
categorized as “inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failure to 
correct known problems, and supervisory violations” (p. 9), as shown in Figure 10 
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Figure 10.  Subcategories of unsafe supervision (from DOD, 2005). 
(1) Inadequate Supervision  
For the success of the mission, the crew of a unit must be managed and supervised 
adequately. The role of superiors is very important in the process of training, guiding, and 
motivating the personnel towards the goal. For example, if the crew is not trained well 
and their mistakes are not corrected promptly the probability of failure in a mission will 
be high. Leading properly improves the skills of the operators (Shappell et al., 2000). 
(2) Planned Inappropriate Operations  
Before a mission, operation planners should make a thorough plan and schedule 
the suitable operators. Gathering necessary data and making risk management can fairly 
reduce the failure rate (Wiegmann et al., 2001). 
(3) Failure to Correct a Known Problem  
Another type of unsafe supervision is the failure to correct a known problem. 
These types of failures occur when the deficiencies in the system, personnel, equipment, 
training, or regulations are known to the superiors but are not corrected before a fatal 
accident takes place. For example, if a pilot is not mentally or physically fit for the 
mission and supervisors let him fly an aircraft, this can result in the loss of the aircraft or 






(4) Supervisory Violations  
Supervisory violations are about the willful omission of regulations, procedures, 
and directives. For example, if a supervisor lets an unqualified pilot fly an aircraft, he 
violates a basic rule and causes the loss of the aircraft; however, these types of practices 
are rare in nature (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
4. Organizational Influences  
Not only are the performances of the operators affected by supervisory failures, 
but also affected by the organizational fallacies. These fallacies are grouped into three 
categories as resource/acquisition management, organizational climate, and 










Figure 11.  Subcategories of organizational influences (from DOD, 2005). 
(1) Resource/Acquisition Management 
Resource management is the art of allocating personnel, budget, and equipment 
effectively for a predetermined cause. In this regard, there is a balance between the safety 
level and the resource allocated to reach that level in the organizations. For example, if 
more money is invested on safety measures and training of the pilots, the rate of losing an 
aircraft will decrease. If the quality of equipment and the time allocated for operator 
training decreases because of sequestration on the defense expenses, the rate of aviation 
accidents will increase proportionally. Thus, resources should be managed wisely for the 





















(2) Organizational Climate 
Organizational climate describes the atmosphere of the organization that 
encompasses the relationships, policies, cultures, and command and control structure. 
Creating intimate relationships, sharing authority and responsibility, protecting 
organizational culture, being more human-centric, and being fair are all acts of shaping a 
peaceful atmosphere in an organization. If such issues are disregarded, people become 
more unconcerned about the way they perform and may cause more accidents (Shappell 
et al., 2000). 
(3) Organizational Process 
Formal processes about the regulations, applications, and decisions directly affect 
the way of carrying out activities of an organization. There should be standardized 
methods and formal rules to govern the balance between human needs and mission 
success. For example if the commanding officer sets up a rule by himself and change the 
flight hours of the pilots by increasing rest time, he may increase the risk of losing an 






IV. ANALYSIS OF SELECT UAV ACCIDENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The potential benefits of UAVs for a great number of applications have caught the 
attention of leaders in both the military and commercial sectors. Now UAVs are the new 
trend for many countries’ military forces with their force multiplier effect that increases 
the effectiveness of military services dramatically, and they are popular for the civilian 
sector due mainly to cost factors.   
The UAV, which has a remarkable advantage over manned aircraft, has been 
designed and manufactured with the recent technological developments. Unmanned 
technology rose with the need to remove the physical and mental limitations of humans. 
The assumption was that failure due to human error would be reduced once human 
involvement was reduced. However, this assumption became subject to questioning as 
human error accounted for more accidents in unmanned vehicles than in manned aircraft 
(Asim et al., 2005).  
Human factors that affect UAV flight are more difficult to identify than those that 
affect manned flight. Since the vehicle and operator are separated, optimum human 
performance is hindered by a number of factors like loss of sensory cues, delays in 
control and communication systems, and impediments in scanning the visual 
surroundings of the vehicle.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine sample data related to UA mishaps and 
hazards, determine human error types in those mishaps and hazards, and use quantitative 
analysis to determine what human factor issues are most involved and what precautions 
should be taken. 
B. U.S. NAVY ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
Accidents are classified according to financial damage and/or severity of the 
event. The most severe accident classification is Class A, and the least severe accident 




Table 2.   U.S. Navy Accident Classification System (Nancy B. Jones, 
personal communication, September 17, 2014). 
Class A Class B Class C Class D Hazards (H) 
 
Class A mishap 
is an accident 
which results in 
$2 million or 
more in property 
damage, 
destruction of an 
aircraft, and/or 
injury or illness 





Class B mishap is 
an accident 
which results in 
property damage 
of $500,000 or 
more but less 
than $2 million, 
an injury or 




three or more 
personnel are 
hospitalized for 
inpatient care as 
a result of a 
single mishap. 
 
Class C mishap 
is an accident 
which results in 
property damage 
of $50,000 or 
more but less 
than $500,000 
and/or an injury 
or illness that 
results in one or 
more days away 
from work.  
 
 
Class D mishap 
is an accident 
which results in 
property damage 
of $20,000 or 
more but less 
than $50,000 
and/or an injury 
or illness that is 
greater than a 
first aid injury 




of mishap.  
 
 
Hazards are any 
real or potential 
condition that can 
cause injury, 
illness, or death 
to personnel; 
damage to or loss 
of a system, 
equipment, or 
property; or 
damage to the 
environment.  
 
C. DATA SOURCE 
Our analysis is based on summaries of 68 UA incidents. Those summaries include 
detailed HFAC categories and subcategories, severity classifications of these mishaps, 
and flight hours occurring between fiscal year 2011 (October 1, 2010) and August 2014. 
The information for our analysis was obtained from the Naval Safety Center in Norfolk, 
Virginia. The response (formal letter) to our data request from Nancy B. Jones, Naval 
Safety Center Staff Attorney, is located in Appendix B, and sample data from the 
enclosed coding file of possible mishap factors is shown in Appendix C. 
D. RESULTS 
Data from the safety center was retrospectively assessed and consisted of 68 
events. Figure 12 shows the distribution of the mishap classes and hazards according to 




B type mishap, nine involved Class C type mishaps, and 46 involved Hazards that also 
include causal factors.   
 
Figure 12.  Number of class types of incidents.  
Figure 13 represents that 287 causal factors were attributed to these 68 incidents. 
Of these 287 factors, 186 of them (65 percent) related to human factors, 45 of them 
related to material factors (16 percent), and 56 of them related to special factors (16 
percent).  
 
Figure 13.  Breakdown of causal factors.  
A single mishap may include multiple human factors, material factors, or special 
factors. For example, one incident, a purely mechanical mishap, which does not have any 
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human involvement, was coded as a material factor with the use of HFACS. However, a 
UAV, which had failed due to mechanical factors but was made irrecoverable by human 
causal factors, could be coded as a human-related as well as mechanical failure; an 
example of the latter mishap might be engine failure, but within gliding distance of the 
runway (Thompson, Tvaryanas, & Constable, 2005). 
HFACS data helps to identify the detailed causes for a given mishap. For 
example, the mishap ‘1318652656830’ (see Appendix C) is associated with nine separate 
causal factors, eight human factors, and one material factor. At first glance, the mishap 
looks like a Heated-Throttle Plate (HTPC) failed in flight. However, if we look into the 
mishap, we see the human factors related to the design of the carburetor ice warning 
system and crew members who could not identify the presence of carburetor icing due to 
inadequate training. 
As outlined previously, the HFACS organizes human factors along four levels of 
failure: a) Unsafe Acts; b) Preconditions for Unsafe Acts; c) Supervision; and d) 
Organizational Influences. In the following sections we provide details about these levels 
of failure based on the UAV mishap summaries obtained from the Naval Safety Center.   
1. Unsafe Acts  
Unsafe acts is the first step of investigating the mishaps, focusing on human 
factors in this category by answering the following question. 
What did the operator/payload operator/flight technician do, or not do, to 
cause the mishap (e.g., follow the wrong procedures, use the wrong 
button, made a bad decision, or violated the regulations)? (Naval Safety 
Center, 2012, p. 4) 
In our sample, there are 70 total causal factors for unsafe acts. Figure 14 
illustrates that 66 of the factors are associated with errors and four of them are associated 
with violations. A low rate in the violation category is good because the operator who 
causes a violation deliberately turns aside from the plan, thus breaking the rules and 





Figure 14.  Breakdown unsafe acts.  
Table 3 displays the subcategories of errors. 28 skill-based errors, 34 judgment 
and decision-making errors, and 4 perception errors are seen under error category. 
Procedural error, risk assessment during operations, and decision making during 
operations occur frequently, and should be taken into consideration to reduce human 
errors. Their percentages are 32 percent, 20 percent, and 17 percent, respectively.  















Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Inadvertent Operation 2 3% 
Checklist Error 3 4% 
Procedural Error 21 32% 
Overcontrol/ Undercontrol 1 1% 
Breakdown in Visual Scan 1 1% 
Skill-based Error 28 41% 
Risk Assessment – During Operation 13 20% 
Task Misprioritization 2 3% 
Necessary Action – Rushed 3 5% 
Necessary Action – Delayed 5 8% 
Decision-Making During Operation 11 17% 
Judgment and Decision-Making Errors 34 53% 
Misperception Error 2 3% 
Incorrect response to a misperception 2 3% 




Procedural error is the most prevalent factor under the skilled base category, and 
is of concern when the operator uses the switch or control equipment inaccurately, 
executes the technique inaccurately, or executes the sequence of procedures in the wrong 
order. Procedural errors also include errors of automated systems in navigation, 
calculation, or operation phases. Risk assessment during operation is another main factor 
associated with personnel who evaluate the risks related to a special course of action 
insufficiently, and additionally selects the wrong course of action (Arrabito et al., 2010). 
An incorrect response, not acting properly for a secure flight, to an emergency is a good 
example of a decision-making error during the operation. 
Inappropriate training, fatigue, incorrect operator selection criteria, and workload 
are the major reasons of these errors under unsafe acts. Even though unmanned aircraft 
systems are automated and computerized systems, flight experience is a need, and 
operators should have some aviation background, as this influences the training time and 
affects the training quality. Although two Air Force studies have determined that flying 
experience in manned aircraft is essential for Predator operators, another study found that 
150–200 hours of manned flight time is needed for the pilots to gain the skills to learn 
basic flight maneuvers and landing with Predator (Tvaryanas et al., 2006). From 
experience, the personnel who have flight experience could adapt to UAVs easily, and 
were able to accomplish training more successfully. Moreover, simulators play a 
noticeable role in student training. More simulator hours make training more robust and 
more reliable, and help to provide appropriate training.    
Generally, unmanned aircraft operators are rotated to maintain continuous 
operations during routine 24/7 surveillance periods. Shift work may cause fatigue, and 
eventually this fatigue decreases reaction times (ACC, 2014). While analyzing factors 
such as work source, details of shift systems, and crew rest procedures, analysts found 
that crew members, including pilots and sensor operators, and maintenance personnel of 
MQ-1 Predator, exhibited greater fatigue than manned aircraft crew members and 
maintenance personnel. Additionally, crew members who are stationed at a home base, 




Table 4.   Breakdown of violation type of human factors. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Violation - Based on Risk Assessment 1 25% 
Violation - Routine/Widespread 2 50% 
Violation - Lack of Discipline 1 25% 
 
Even though the number of violations is significantly low compared with the total 
causal factors under unsafe acts, a high percentage (50 percent) of routine, widespread 
violation is the most common. Some procedures or policies can become routine and some 
behaviors can become habitual, but these can eventually cause a mishap or hazard, and 
the personnel should be aware of the results of violation. If the common violations are 
disregarded, these tolerances make the results serious. Personnel who violate the rules 
should be warned and encouraged to follow the normal procedures. Table 4 displays the 
breakdown of violation factors. 
2. Preconditions 
Figure 15 summarizes the root categories of preconditions. Personnel factors rank 
highest with 35 instances. Of the other two precondition factors, environmental factors 
have half as many incidents compared to personnel factors, and the condition of 
individuals (Table 5) has 26 instances. Preconditions are the second step of investigating 
the mishaps. The following question is tried to be answered in this category: “Why did 





Figure 15.  Breakdown of preconditions (from Naval Safety Center, 2012). 
 
Table 5.   Breakdown of condition of individuals. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Inattention 2 7% 
Channelized Attention 2 8% 
Negative Transfer 2 8% 
Distraction 3 11% 
Checklist Interference 1 4% 
Cognitive Factors 10 38% 
Overconfidence 3 11% 
Complacency 6 23% 
Misplaced Motivation 1 4% 
Excessive Motivation to Succeed 1 4% 
Get-Home-It is/Get-There-It is 2 8% 
Psycho-Behavioral Factors 13 50% 
Misinterpreted/Misread Instrument 1 4% 
Expectancy 2 8% 





















Factors associated with the conditions of individuals are divided into three main 
categories according to HFACS classification: cognitive, psycho-behavioral, and 
perceptual. When we aggregated the human factor issues into the three categories, 
psycho-behavioral and cognitive factors represent a significant proportion of the 
individual factors explaining UAV failure.  
The cognitive factors that were seen in this study included two inattention, 
channelized attention, and negative transfers; three distractions; and one checklist 
interference. Increased alertness and readiness of the personnel will eventually reduce the 
cognitive factors in accidents. Efficient and effective scheduling and judicial workload 
assessment can solve these problems. For example, working six hours, taking a two-hour 
rest, then working another six hours, can be exhausting, and trigger attention loss for 
crew members. A four-hour mission in a control ground station can notably reduce the 
efficiency and performance to a crew, making them senseless, numb, and careless. 
Psycho-Behavioral Factors include overconfidence (11 percent), complacency (23 
percent), get-home-it is/get-there-it is (8 percent)—which reflects a factor when an 
individual or crew short-cut necessary procedures or execute poor judgment due to 
complete a mission or reach a result in a short period time for personal reasons—negative 
transfer (4 percent), misplaced motivation (4 percent), and excessive motivation to 
succeed (4 percent) factors (Arrabito et al., 2010).  
Overconfidence and complacency are generally problems of experienced 
personnel. Often people who are performing the same job for a long time think that they 
can follow the procedures and checklist operations by heart; however, this may blind 
them to the hazards in advance, or miss some extremely important point when dealing 
with emergency situations. According to the occurrence rate, motivation-related issues 
are negligible for this study; however, it is important to balance the motivation level of 
the personnel, because both under-motivated and over-motivated individuals can easily 
make mistakes.  
Finally, only one misinterpreted/misread instrument and two expectancy types of 




Environmental Factors refer to technological and physical environmental factors. 
Table 6 shows also the distribution of subcategories that related to both physical and 
technological environment. Table 6 clearly shows that technological environment factors 
are more prevalent than the physical environment. 
Table 6.   Breakdown of environmental factors. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors        Percentage 
Vision Restricted by 
Meteorological Conditions 3 18% 
Physical Environment 3 18% 
Instrumentation and Sensory 
Feedback Systems 6 35% 
Controls and Switches 1 6% 
Automation 2 12% 
Communications – 
Equipment 5 29% 
Technological Environment 14 82% 
 
Eighty-two percent of the environmental factors are associated with technological 
environments, such as the switches and control systems, instrumentation and sensory 
feedback systems, communications equipment, task factors, and automation factors. 
Technological factors can be reduced by design implementations and technological 
developments. Every new technological improvement eliminates the gaps of the 
existence systems. More reliable, safer, more accurate and more robust systems can be 
developed to reduce technological factors.  
Increasing the redundancy in some of the crucial systems is one way to handle 
technological factors. For example, Inertial Navigation System/Global Positioning 
System (INS/GPS), Differential GPS (DGPS), GPS, Data link, and Dead reckoning are 
the five navigation systems in the Heron type of UAV. There are some sensor 
redundancies in making the system safe, especially in control equipment and engines. It 
is difficult to predict the malfunctions or defects in the system, but it is possible to be 




the developers and also for the users. High mishap rates during the landing and take-off 
phase (Lum & Waggoner, 2011) provide a change from manual to automatic take-off and 
landing (ATOL) systems. 
Another method of dealing with technological factors is providing user-friendly 
software and hardware systems, as well as ground control stations. An operator uses 
menus to navigate the UA by entering destination coordinates or drawing the route, and 
uses screens to see the sensor data such as engine indicators or landing gear position. No 
one wants to deal with complicated menus, disturbing screens, or an uncomfortable 
environment; as a result, these can be the cause of severe mishaps.     
Physical environment can be another problem for the UA flights, as long 
endurance flights can make it difficult to predict weather conditions. Weather forecasts 
can abruptly change over time. ATOL systems eliminate cloudy, rainy, and foggy 
weather conditions, and satellite communication provides advantages to UAS to land on 
alternate runways with good weather conditions.   
Table 7 shows the breakdown of personnel factors; results show that all the 
personnel factors are related to coordination, communication, and planning (CCP) issues. 
The most significant ones are miscommunication, tasks, mission-in-progress re-planning, 
communicating critical information, and cross-monitoring type of factors. There are no 
self-imposed stress-related factors that cause accidents or hazards like inadequate 
physical fitness, alcohol and drug usage, supplements like nicotine or caffeine, self-
medication, or inadequate rest. Some of the CCP factors are reduced through training 
programs related to risk management through reevaluation of changes in dynamic 





Table 7.   Breakdown of personnel factors. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Crew/Team Leadership 3 8% 
Cross-Monitoring Performance 5 14% 
Assertiveness 1 3% 
Communicating Critical Information 6 17% 
Challenge and Reply 1 3% 
Mission Planning 2 6% 
Mission Briefing 2 6% 
Task/Mission-In-Progress Re-
Planning 7 20% 
Miscommunication 8 23% 
Coordination, Communication, 
Planning (CCP) Factors 35 100% 
 
3. Supervision 
Analyzing the supervision factors is the third step in the investigation of mishaps. 
Generally, human factors can be identified in this category by answering questions such 
as: “What error did the command/supervisors make? and “What is the command’s role in 
this event?” (Naval Safety Center, 2012, p. 4). When supervision fails in the 
identification, recognition, assessment, or in controlling and mitigating the risks through 
the means of guidance, training, or oversight, these factors often are used during 
operations in environments exceeding the capabilities of mishap RPA operators (Arrabito 
et al., 2010). 
Generally, the findings reflected that perhaps someone in the command noticed 
the person’s preconditions, but did not take steps to forestall a mishap, or perhaps there 
were guidance documents and SOP in place, but they were ambiguous or not enforced. 
After analyzing supervision-related factors, the command better understands where they 
should focus for better results in the future (Naval Safety Center, 2012). 
Figure 16 shows that inadequate supervision is the major factor, and exists in 20 




planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct known problems, and supervisory 
violations. Categories and subcategories are displayed in Table 8. 
 
Figure 16.  Breakdown of supervision-related factors. 
Table 8.   Breakdown of supervision subcategories. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Personnel Management 2 6% 
Operations Management 3 9% 
Leadership/Supervision/Oversight 
Inadequate 3 9% 
Local Training Issues/Programs 10 29% 
Supervision – Policy 6 17% 
Supervision – Lack of Feedback 1 3% 
Ordered/Led on Mission Beyond 
Capability 1 3% 
Risk Assessment – Formal 4 11% 
Authorized Unnecessary Hazard 2 6% 
Supervision – Discipline 
Enforcement (Supervisory act of 
omission) 
1 3% 

























The most significant of these subcategories are operations management, local 
training issues or programs, inadequate supervision policies, formal risk assessments, and 
inadequate leadership and oversight.  
It is the responsibility of supervisors to provide the right training opportunities, 
guidance, leadership, motivation, and the proper role model, regardless of how superior 
they are. If they fail to obtain these integral parts, the personnel tend to make more 
mistakes. Supervisors should be open to new policies to stimulate personnel motivation, 
increase their management and leadership features, and be aware of the training under 
their personnel (Arrabito et al., 2010). 
4. Organizational Influences  
Finally, organizational influences are investigated when mishaps or hazards 
occur. Organizational influences help to look at the organization as a whole. These 
factors can occur due to unclear procedures or insufficient training, or by confusing the 
structure in an organization. Sometimes budgetary issues may also play an important role 
because some equipment and items are known to be imperfect and defective, yet remain 
unrepaired (Naval Safety Center, 2012). Of the 51 error types of organizational influence 
factors, 32 of them are related to organizational processes, 11 of them are related to 






Figure 17.  Breakdown of organizational influences.  
Tables 9, 10, and 11 exhibit other subcategories, numbers of incidents, and the 
percentages of the organizational influences. 
Table 9.   Breakdown of organizational climate. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Unit/Organizational Values/Culture 1 12% 
Perceptions of Equipment 4 50% 
Organizational Structure 3 38% 
 
Table 9 exhibits the breakdown of organizational climate factors. Perception of 
equipment is the major issue in the organizational climate category. The automation 
capabilities and sensors of unmanned aircraft make flight procedures easier for the 
operator, but do not mean that the operator trusts the system and equipment all of the 
time. Some of the systems may not work properly during the flight or in case of 
emergency, and thus the operator should anticipate the potential system errors in advance.  
Table 10 presents the subcategories of organizational processes. Because of their 
high percentages, organizational processes are major contributors. Written documents 






















guidance/publications. Although there are many controversies about the training periods 
and the selection criteria of the UAV personnel, it is important to provide good training 
and necessary information to provide safe UA operations.   
Procedural guidance/publications, organizational training issues/programs, and 
program oversight/program management are the primary focus of organizational process 
issues. All the procedures, programs, and trainings should be revised periodically to 
provide accurate procedures, more detailed programs, and more enhanced training. 
Table 10.   Breakdown of organizational processes. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Ops Tempo/Workload 2 6% 
Procedural Guidance/Publications 14 44% 
Organizational Training Issues/Programs 6 19% 
Doctrine 1 3% 
Program Oversight/Program 
Management 9 28% 
 
Table 11 shows the subcategories of resource/acquisition management factors. 
Acquisition policies and design processes are the major factors under resource/acquisition 
management category. Project managers and acquisition personnel should always keep in 
contact with users to understand the requirements clearly and to explain them to the 
developers who design the UA and ground control station. Additionally, to implement 
better designs, they should acquire and understand the lessons learned from mishap and 
hazard cases.  
Table 11.   Breakdown of resource/acquisition factors. 
Human Factor Issue Number of Factors Percentage 
Air Traffic Control Resources 1 9% 
Acquisition Policies/Design Processes 7 64% 
Personnel Resources 1 9% 




In one incident of our study, warning, caution, and advisory (WCA) messaging 
systems failed to alert crew in a timely manner. Further investigations should be done 
about this system to find the best solution to prevent issues in the future. 
E. CONCLUSION 
HFACS provides insight into the evaluation about mishaps or hazards. Our study 
revealed the importance of human factors in unmanned aircraft accidents with recent data 
retrieved from HFACS. Sixty-five percent of the factors were associated with human 
factors in our sample data of mishaps and hazards.  
The major human contributing factors are procedural types of errors under skill-
based error categories, such as: improper risk assessment during inappropriate decision-
making operations under judgment and error categories; overconfidence and 
complacency factors under psycho-behavioral factors; instrumentation and sensory 
feedback system faults and communication equipment failures under technological 
environment factors; cross-monitoring performance, communicating critical information, 
task/mission-in-progress re-planning, miscommunication under CCP; procedural 
guidance/publications and program oversight/program management under organizational 
influences; and local training issues, programs, and supervision policies under 
supervision factors.  
To reduce mishaps, the first approach should be to prioritize the above factors. 
The second step should be to find the improvement options, and the last step should be to 
find the possible concealed factors that cannot be identified. Using HFACS helps to 
identify causal factors under specific categories to prevent further hazards and further 
accidents with the same cause. It is also a useful system to see which factors have arisen 











V. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided an in-depth view and detailed categorization to 
identify the extent of human factors in mishaps. However, it is also important to provide 
homogeneity and consensus while judging and categorizing these factors because human 
misinterpretation and misperception can cause different categorization results while 
evaluating the data that related to mishap. This is a very important issue because the 
results of HFACS analyses are helpful for decision makers in determining how money 
should be allocated to decrease the occurrence of future mishaps (Bilbro, 2013).   
According to the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition, all data exists in the 
environment and sensor systems can only detect some of them. Users access less data 
than detected by the technological systems and the decision makers perceive data by 
using the reachable detected portion. Moreover, the decision maker’s states and traits, 
social circumstances, as well as personal experience influence their perception (Miller & 
Shattuck, 2005). This model might depict comprising the investigation reports of UAS 
mishaps. Mishap investigators can obtain some data associated with the mishap from the 
crew, meteorological station, the mishap UA (telemetry and video records) and try to 
come up with the reasons of the accident. However, in this process, they categorize the 
causal factors of the accident differently.  
Although the HFACS is the most recent and common mishap analysis system that 
categorizes human errors in great detail, there can be a human error even in the analysis 
phase. In this chapter our goal is to find out whether there are some discrepancies among 
people’s categorization behaviors by using sample case studies.  
B. CASE STUDIES 
The case studies include both the executive summary and the findings from three 
MALE types of UA mishaps. The mishap was selected from United States Air Force 




number of findings and level of complication. The accident reports that were used in this 
study were MQ-1B, 07–3249 (17 May 2011), MQ-1B, T/N 99–3058 (26 October 2012), 
and MQ-1B, T/N 03–3122 (30 January 2012) (USAF AIB Reports, 2014). 
Before evaluating the findings, we present and summarize the cases. Then using 
HFACS categories and subcategories, we evaluate the mishap factors. We used findings 
from the investigation report and used DOD HFACS coding to estimate the possible 
factors that can cause this mishap. The purpose of our analysis here is to evaluate the 
mishap based on our knowledge of HFACS classification taxonomy by using significant 
findings and assigning a suitable category with our interpretation of them, and then 
comparing them with the original ones. We want to know whether these categories fit or 
not, and thus to see the possibility of human error in evaluation of mishap/investigation 
phase.  
We did not look at the original investigation reports until we finished our 
evaluation to avoid bias. We wanted to come up with authentic results that reflect our 
opinions. And we use exactly the same, word for word, findings from the investigation 
reports to reduce the possibility of giving a different meaning to a finding, even though it 
can be only slightly different.  
1. Case 1 
a. Summary 
On 17 May 2011, at approximately 0217L, an MQ-1B, Tail Number (T/N) 
07–3249, deployed from the 49 Wing at Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), 
NM impacted the terrain during approach and landing in Djibouti. The 
mishap crew (MC), deployed from the 432nd Wing, Creech AFB, NV, 
were recovering the mishap remotely piloted aircraft (MRPA) on an early 
return from an operational mission in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF). The MRPA returned early due to a slow oil leak. The 
mishap pilot (MP) attempted to maneuver the MPRA to avoid clouds on 
arrival and intercepted final approach course and glidepath. However, low 
clouds and high humidity in the Djibouti local area obscured both IR 
sensors used by the crew to visually identify the runway environment at 
night. Additionally, inaccuracies in the LN100G INS/GPS altitude resulted 




path. On the approach to Djibouti from the west, the terrain slopes from 
approximately 50 feet above mean sea level (MSL) at the touchdown zone 
upwards to 300 feet above MSL at four nautical miles (NM) from the end 
of the runway on final approach. The MP initiated a go-around at 
approximately 20 feet AGL at 2.4 NM on final approach, but was too late 
to avoid impact. The MRPA and one Air-to-Ground Missile (AGM)-114 
Hellfire missile onboard were destroyed on impact at a cost of $2,983,766. 
There was no other government or private property damage or injuries to 
civilians on the ground. (MQ-1B, 07-3249, 17 May 2011, USAF AIB 
Reports, 2014, p. 1). 
b. Significant Human-Related Findings from the Investigation 
The following human-related findings are from the investigation report that raters 
use to match the data with the appropriate HFACS category (USAF AIB Reports, 2014, 
pp. 6–15). 
1. UA pilot appears to perform an inadequate cross check during the final 
approach to Djibouti/Ambouli Airport, Djibouti. The last time the pilot 
mentions an altitude is departing 4,000 feet over the VOR, over 5 minutes 
prior to impact.  
2. During the descent in the clouds, the mishap sensor operator (MSO) was 
not aggressive in monitoring the safety of the approach. The last mention 
of altitude was at 1,600 feet MSL as the aircraft was descending into 
Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) conditions. (While there was 
talk of a potential go-around if the MP could not visually locate the 
runway, the MSO became focused on the infrared (IR) sensor picture 
instead of the approach information depicted on the Head-up Display 
(HUD)). Additionally, the MSO attempted two 2-point non-uniformity 
corrections to his IR picture at lower altitudes, once at just over 600 feet 
MSL. This caused him to essentially be blind for up for 40 seconds while 
the camera recalibrated in the weather which was a non-essential task at 
the time.  
3. The MC perceived that fogging or malfunctioning sensors were the 
reasons of their obscured infrared HUD pictures. This misperception leads 
the MSO to continue attempting to correct his sensor below a safe altitude.  
4. The conditions displayed on the sensors depicted low cloud decks and 
high humidity, causing an unclear picture on both screens. Additionally, 





5. MP focused his conscious attention on the course and glide path 
corrections, but failed to adequately monitor his altitude and distance from 
the runway. 
6. Pilots on home station and during initial training do not normally fly the 
MQ-1 in IMC, but in simulated conditions to satisfy training requirements 
7. The majority of the MQ-1 community uses 200 feet as a decision height. 
The decision height to be used on an instrument approach is based only on 
experience level of the pilot. Decision height is not an altitude chosen by 
the pilot, but dictated by the pilot’s weather category minimums. This 
inaccurate decision height is taught at the formal training unit (FTU) as 
well. 
8. The air traffic controllers at Djibouti/Ambouli Airport, Djibouti, had given 
incorrect altimeter settings in the past, including during the launch of the 
mishap sortie. The MRPA static port altitude after impact was reading 50 
feet higher than the altitude that flight planning software indicated for 
terrain at the impact site. 
9. At approximately 8,000 feet MSL, the MP checked the LN100G INS/GPS 
altitude against both the Novatel GPS altitude and the static port altitude 
and believed they were matched within 100 feet. (All three sources can be 
read and compared on a heads-down display (HDD), but only one is 
displayed in the HUD.) However, at that point, telemetry data downloaded 
after the accident from the GCS showed the LN100G INS/GPS altitude 
was actually 420 feet higher than the Novatel GPS altitude and 820 feet 
higher than the static port derived altitude that was displayed in the MP’s 
HUD. 
c. Our Categorization and Analysis 
This mishap is a Class A type of mishap which caused $2,983,766 in damages to 
the aircraft and hellfire missile together. The following numbered list shows our 
categorization and evaluation of major findings.  
1. The UA pilot should have followed the routine procedures and checked 
for the range to the ground. He left the altitude out during descent and crashed into the 
ground in the final approach. The MP would not have crashed if he had checked for the 
altimeter properly all through the descent. Also there is a lack of cross-monitoring 
performance. Because other crew members did not monitor the MP’s actions during the 




2. While there is an emergency and bad weather conditions, MSO did not 
focus on the most important phase of the flight. He disregarded critical landing approach 
and continued to reset the IR camera. Although he knew that it would take time, he 
misprioritized the tasks and put recalibration of IR camera in the first place. Also, we 
consider that this finding fits with the decision making during operation error because 
MSO selected the inaccurate course of action during time-constrained phase. Moreover, 
there should be a warning or caution message to avoid recalibrating the IR camera during 
approach and landing. It is not stated in the investigation report, but if there is no 
indication then we can say that procedural guidance/publication error is also a 
contributing factor along with misprioritization. However, if there is an indication in the 
SOP or checklist and MSO ignore it, then this refers to violation type of factors. Because 
it is not stated, we do not use these categories in this case’s comparison part. 
3. It is obvious that MSO had a misperception in exploring the reason for the 
obscured IR HUD pictures. The MC thought that fogging or damaged sensors caused 
obscured IR HUD pictures and he tried to correct the sensor below a safe altitude and 
caused an unsafe situation. This shows that error due to misperception is a contributing 
factor in the accident. He should not have done the corrective actions below the safe 
altitude.  
4. The foggy weather, humidity, and darkness adversely affected the ability 
of the instrument and forced the operator to rely merely on the IR sensors. After the 
investigation it was realized that there was no fogging on the lenses and the sensors on 
the ground. This shows that obscuration on the IR instrument was caused by the severe 
weather conditions during the flight.   
5. Channelized attention and task misprioritization are two contributing 
factors. Channelized attention occurs if an operator or pilot focuses on a specific subject 
and disregards other environmental factors leading to a hazardous situation. During the 
descent, the MO solely focused on the course and glide path corrections and did not pay 
attention to the altimeter and distance warnings. He should have monitored all the data 
for a secure landing. In addition, if the MO had organized his tasks properly for a secure 




would have avoided the accident. This shows that task misprioritization was a 
contributing factor in the accident. 
6. It is necessary to be ready for the real-life conditions because UA pilots do 
not always have a chance to select the better option, in this case the better weather 
conditions. Instead of flying the MQ-1 in IMC, UA pilots who are on home station and 
initial training use simulators to simulate conditions to satisfy training requirements. 
However, real conditions and simulations do not always match. Hence, this is why local 
training issues/programs are a contributing factor in the accident.  
7. Local training issues/programs are a contributing factor here as well. The 
200-foot decision height used on an IMC approach is taught formally in the training 
phase, and it is generally accepted, but it has not been accepted on a written statutory 
basis. Pilots should be taught to use legal decision height. Otherwise, the decision height 
is liable to change from individual to individual depending on their experience level. 
Also, Leadership/Supervision/Oversight Inadequate is another contributing factor related 
to the 200 foot decision height. Leaders or supervisors should always investigate fallacies 
regarding the system and find ways to correct them. In the given case, supervisors should 
have directed the trainers for effective training methods and led them to bring up more 
inquisitive pilots.  
8. The investigators found that the air traffic controllers at Djibouti/Ambouli 
Airport, Djibouti, had given incorrect altimeter settings in the past, including during the 
launch of the mishap sortie. The altimeter on the MRPA was showing faulty altitude at 
the crash site. This shows that unsuitable informational support provided by the airport 
was a contributing factor in the accident. 
9. Although, at the first glance, it looks like a material error (OR004 
Acquisition Policies/Design Processes) which was not evaluated in the investigation 
report, there can be also a human error in this. The MP checked, yet he could not see the 
mismatch between INS/GPS altitude and the static port altitude. It is possible that he 
misread the altitude, misinterpreted the altitude, or focused on another procedure while 
trying to read the altitudes. He could not catch the difference; we inferred a possible 




expected all altitude devices to match within normal limits and although he checked 
them, he operated under a false perception. 
d. Comparison 
The left column of Table 12 exhibits the original coding of human factors that are 
taken from investigation report and the right column shows our coding from our 
evaluation.  
Table 12.   Comparison of coding of human factors. 
 INVESTIGATION REPORT  OUR EVALUATION 
1 Breakdown in Visual Scan AE103 Procedural Error, PP102 
Cross-Monitoring Performance 
2 AE202 Task Misprioritization AE202 Task Misprioritization  
AE206 Decision-Making During 
Operation 
3 AE301Error Due to Misperception AE301 Error Due to 
Misperception 
4 PE102 Vision Restricted by 
Meteorological Conditions 
PE102 Vision Restricted by 
Meteorological Conditions 
5 PC102 Channelized Attention PC102 Channelized Attention,  
AE202 Task Misprioritization 
6 SI003 Local Training Issues/
Programs 
SI003 Local Training Issues/
Programs 
7 SI003 Local Training Issues/
Programs 













2. Case 2 
e. Summary 
On 26 October 2012, at approximately 2222 hours Zulu time (Z), an MQ-




nautical miles southwest of Jalalabad Air Base (AB), Afghanistan, after 
completing a 20.4 hour surveillance mission. The MRPA was forward 
deployed from the 432nd Wing, Creech AFB, NV. The MRPA was 
operated by the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron, Creech AFB, NV. The 
MRPA and one air-to-ground Hellfire missile were destroyed on impact. 
The total damage to United States Government property was assessed to 
be $4,600,000 There were no injuries or damage to other government or 
civilian property. On 26 October 2012, at 0159Z, after normal preflight 
checks, the MRPA taxied and departed Jalalabad AB, Afghanistan. 
Handover from the Launch and Recovery Element to the Mission Control 
Element (MCE) was uneventful. At approximately 2200Z, the MCE 
completed their assigned surveillance mission and steered towards 
Jalalabad AB to return to base. At 2206Z, the MC, which consisted of the 
MP and the Mishap Sensor Operator, received a Variable Pitch Propeller 
(VPP) servo high temperature caution message on the HDD. This message 
was the first indication of a VPP problem. Eventually, the VPP failed in a 
manner that only allowed movement to a lower propeller pitch angle. 
While attempting to resolve the problem, the MP momentarily 
commanded the propeller pitch to an angle that produced reverse thrust. 
The system would not accept commands to a higher propeller pitch angle. 
Next, the MP shut down the engine to increase the glide distance due to 
the reverse thrust. The resulting loss of forward thrust prevented the 
MRPA from returning back to base or reaching a suitable landing location. 
Finally, the MP was directed to crash the MRPA, with the Hellfire missile 
attached, into the terrain because it would not be able to reach Jalalabad 
AB and there were no Forward Operating Bases nearby. The MP did as 
directed causing the MRPA to impact the terrain at 2222Z (MQ-1B, T/N 
99–3058, 26 October 2012, USAF AIB Reports, 2014, p. 1). 
f. Significant Human-Related Findings from the Investigation 
The following human-related findings are from the investigation report that raters 
use to match the data with the appropriate HFACS category (USAF AIB Reports, 2014, 
p. 10). 
1. Although the aircrew checklist has no notes, warnings, or cautions 
concerning unnecessary movements of the propeller pitch lever outside of 
a regime acceptable for sustained flight, the narrative section of the flight 
manual discusses intermittent and permanently frozen VPP servo failures. 
2. The narrative section of the flight manual (TO 1Q-1(M) B-1) Propeller 
Servo Overheat/Servo Failure checklist addresses several possible 
symptoms of a failing VPP servo. The checklist itself has no notes, 




pitch lever outside of a regime acceptable for sustained flight. 
Additionally, the checklist assumes an overheating VPP servo will 
continuously attempt to move to match the commanded propeller pitch 
setting. In reality, when the propeller pitch lever is adjusted, the VPP 
servo will only attempt to move for three seconds. 
3. In the MQ-1B simulator, an overheating VPP servo continues to draw 
current indefinitely and the servo heats up as a result. To stop the current 
and resulting overheating of the servo, crews are taught to manually move 
the propeller pitch lever to match the failed position of the VPP servo. 
Unlike the simulator, the aircraft VPP servo will only attempt to move for 
three seconds. 
g. Our Categorization and Analysis 
This mishap is a Class A type of mishap which caused a total of $4,600,000 in 
property damage to the aircraft and hellfire missile together. The following numbered list 
shows our categorization and evaluation of major findings.  
1. According to investigation report, both MP and MSO are experienced and 
well-trained personnel. So, they are expected to be familiar with all the documents 
associated to UA. However, the narrative section of the checklist gives information about 
temporary and lasting VPP failures; MP did not refer to the flight manual narrative parts 
during the flight. This can be a sign of lacking technical/procedural knowledge. 
2. There are some gaps in the documents associated with VPP servo failure. 
Although the narrative section of the flight manual explains some of the initial signs of 
the VPP servo failure, the checklist does not address any guidance about the propeller 
failure. Thus, if the operators were to check the narrative section of the checklist, they 
would have avoided the accident. However, they relied on the checklist itself, which is 
the routine procedure. Procedural Guidance/Publications should be clearer and refer to 
other documents if they do not touch on a specific subject. 
3. The way to handle an overheating VPP servo taught in the training center 
was not effective to solve the propeller problem. The operators should have been trained 
for real-life scenarios and they should not have solely relied on simulator artifacts. Also, 
operators transferred their experience in the simulator to a real situation, but it did not 




caused the accident. On the other hand, it would work in the simulators. This analysis 
shows that organizational training issues/programs and negative transfers were two 
contributing factors in the accident. 
h. Comparison 
The left column of Table 13 exhibits the original coding of human factors that are 
taken from investigation report and the right column shows our coding from our 
evaluation.  
Table 13.   Comparison of coding of human factors. 
 INVESTIGATION REPORT  OUR EVALUATION 









3 OP004 Organizational Training 
Issues/Programs 
OP004 Organizational Training 
Issues/Programs,  
PC105 Negative Transfer 
 
 
3. Case 3 
i. Summary 
On 30 January, 2012, at approximately 1000 hours Zulu (Z) time, the 
MRPA, a MQ-1B Predator, T/N 03–3122, operated by the 18th 
Reconnaissance Squadron (RS), 432nd Wing, Creech AFB, made a forced 
landing just outside the perimeter fence of Kandahar Air Base (AB). The 
crash site was an unpopulated area adjacent to the base. There were no 
injuries and there was no damage to other government or private property. 
The estimated loss is valued at $4.5 million and includes the MRPA and 
one AGM-114 Hellfire missile. 
After normal preflight checks, the MRPA taxied and departed from a 
forward operating location at 0632Z. During the flight, the MCE crew, 
mishap crew #1 (MC1), observed abnormal engine temperature 
indications. The abnormal temperature indications worsened, accompanied 




MC1 began an emergency diversion to the closest suitable divert field, 
Kandahar AB. At 0922Z, MC1 lost video feed and positive flight control 
of the MRPA, but monitored flight data as it began a slow descending 
right-hand spiral through a full circle. At 0933Z, the Launch and Recovery 
Element (LRE) crew at Kandahar AB, mishap crew #2 (MC2), regained 
positive flight control of the MRPA and guided it to a forced landing. 
The Abbreviated Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) President found, 
by clear and convincing evidence, the cause of the mishap was a loss of 
coolant. During the mishap flight, the coolant pump supply line failed, 
releasing the engine’s coolant. As the coolant supply decreased, the 
Cylinder Head Temperature increased excessively. Heat expansion of the 
cylinders permitted compressed gases from the combustion chambers to 
“blow by” the pistons, reducing power output and preventing sustained 
flight. 
The AAIB President found, by a preponderance of evidence, that a 
significant contributing factor to the loss of the MRPA was the failure to 
detect damage during a 60-hour engine inspection on 26 January 2012 on 
the coolant pump supply line and the oil cooler-to-oil pump oil line, which 
were routed in a manner that permitted friction chafing. Additionally, the 
AAIB President found, by a preponderance of evidence, that a 
significantly contributing factor to the loss of the MRPA was Mishap Pilot 
#2’s (MP2) unintentional “hostile takeover” of the MRPA at 0922Z, when 
MP2 failed to ensure the Line-of-Sight control link transmitter was 
unpowered as MP2 turned the ground antenna toward the MRPA. The 
1,200 feet of altitude lost in the ensuing unintentional spiral prevented a 
safe recovery of the crippled aircraft (MQ-1B, T/N 03–3122, 30 January 
2012, USAF AIB Reports, 2014, p. 1). 
j. Significant Human-Related Findings from the Investigation 
The following human-related findings are from the investigation report that raters 
use to match the data with the appropriate HFACS category (USAF AIB Reports, 2014, 
pp. 13–15). 
1. MC1 did not complete the Engine Overheat checklist, which directs the 
pilot to turn on the engine cooling fan and reduce the electrical load on the 
alternators. Use of the cooling fan by the MC2 resulted in a decrease in oil 
temperature, but by that time significant engine damage had already 
occurred. 
2. During MP2’s rack reconfiguration, MP2 rushed through loading the 




transmitter set to ON instead of setting to OFF as directed in the setup 
checklists. The unrecognized assumption of control of the MRPA resulted 
in a wing’s level, descending, rudder turn through a full circle and altitude 
loss of over 1,200 feet. This unintended maneuver resulted in an 
unrecoverable loss of altitude required for a safe landing. 
3. Though aware of the engine cooling fan’s capabilities, MP1 failed to turn 
on the engine coolant fan. Use of the cooling fan by the MC2 resulted in a 
decrease in oil temperature, but by that time significant engine damage 
had already occurred. 
4. MC1 initially analyzed cockpit engine indications, referenced Technical 
Order data, and correctly diagnosed the situation as a loss of coolant-
induced Engine Overheat. MC1 expected an Engine Failure was 
imminent. This expectancy led MSO1 and eventually MC1 to the false 
perception that the loss of altitude and additional high engine temperatures 
indicated an engine failure instead of realizing these were logical effects 
of an engine overheat. MP1 executed the Engine Failure checklist and did 
not resume or complete the Engine Overheat checklist. Timely execution 
of the Engine Overheat checklist could have reduced the damage done to 
the combustion system and reduced the electrical load on the engine. 
5. In accordance with normal procedure, MC2 expected to have their LOS 
control link transmitter set to OFF and to see the LOS video from the 
aircraft without taking control of it. Their expectation became a false 
perception when they captured the LOS video signal from the aircraft and 
perceived that the actions taken by the aircraft were the result of MC1 
satellite control inputs instead of their own. Their false perception resulted 
in an unrecoverable loss of altitude required for a safe landing. 
6. Due to the design and capabilities of the MQ-1B Predator weapons 
system, any Emergency Procedure originating with an MCE will normally 
terminate with the LRE. Training does not adequately instruct the handoff 
of information to the LRE concerning the nature of emergency aircraft, 
status of critical systems, checklist procedures already accomplished, 
desired plan for the next crew to accomplished, or nonstandard hand back 
settings. Lack of training in time-critical emergency coordination between 
MCE and LRE crews led to misinformation getting to the LRE about the 
actual status of the aircraft and an unnecessarily elevated sense of urgency 
that contributed to MP2 leaving the LOS control link set to ON during his 
setup. 
7. Mishap Maintainer 1 (MM1) and Mishap Maintainer 2 (MM2) conducted 
the last 60-hour inspection on the MRPA. Expert testimony states that the 




during the 60-hour inspection of 26 January 2012 and that the damage 
should have been detected during the conduct of a normal 60-hour 
inspection. 
8. MSO1 had under confidence in the Predator system stating multiple times 
that the aircraft was acting on its own accord after they lost video in the 
GCS. This under confidence inhibited effective troubleshooting and CRM 
in the cockpit because of the assumption that there was nothing to be done 
about the situation at hand. 
k. Our Categorization and Analysis 
This mishap is a Class A type of mishap which caused a total of $4,500,000 in 
property damage and includes the MRPA and one AGM-114 Hellfire missile together. 
The following numbered list shows our categorization and evaluation of significant 
findings.  
1. Checklist error and technical/procedural knowledge are the prominent 
contributing factors in the given situation. Because MC1 did not complete the Engine 
Overheat checklist properly and thus did not use thorough information about the current 
operability of the MRPA. Despite the fact that the crew was experienced enough and 
trained well, they disregarded the importance of completing the checklist during flight. 
This shows that they did not absorb everything they were taught at the training center. 
The first things they were taught are to trust the instruments and follow the checklist.  
2. In order to take the control of the MRPA, MC2 hurried to load the new 
data to the system and forgot to set LOS control link transmitter OFF as directed in the 
set-up checklists. This unintentional act of the crew caused the MRPA to lose altitude and 
created an unsafe situation. They had to follow the checklist and should not have 
panicked while taking immediate precautions. It is important to calm down when 
confronted with an emergency situation. Doing everything quickly and carelessly can 
make the things worse. That is why Necessary Action – Rushed is the contributing factor.  
3. Task/Mission-In-Progress Re-Planning is the major contributing factor in 
the given situation. During flight, MC1 realized the abnormal temperature changes in the 




coolant in time. This caused significant damage in the engine and created an unsafe 
situation. MC1 had to change the mission plan for a secure flight. 
4. MC1 noticed the abnormal engine temperature change and thought that 
this would result in an engine failure. There was just an engine overheat which could 
have avoided or alleviated the damage if the crew had turned on the cooler in time. 
However, the MC1’s misperception of the overheating as a failure of engine led to the 
loss of MRPA.   
5. MC2 believed the transmitter was set to OFF. This wrong assumption 
together with the misperception of MC2 caused an incurable loss of altitude required for 
a safe landing. MC2 thought that MC1 took control of the UA and set the LOS control to 
OFF when they got the LOS video signal. This false perception caused an error in 
expectancy and they did not take action in time. 
6. Training on handover procedures in time-critical emergencies is 
inadequate. Information sharing between the crew who give the control of the aircraft and 
who take the control of the aircraft did not coordinated properly. The deficiency in these 
fields caused the MP2 set the LOS control link ON when they intervene. However, such 
an intervention worsened the situation and caused the loss of the MRPA. Organizational 
Training Issues/Programs are the contributor factor in this finding. 
7. Even though maintainers made a comprehensive routine inspection before 
the flight they could not detect the damage in the coolant. According to the experts there 
could be a problem with the engine coolant even before the operation but lack of 
attention by the maintainers caused the damage to go unnoticed. This shows that 
inattention is a contributing factor in the accident. 
8. MSO1 had some concerns about the reliability of the Predator system. 
They experienced control problems many times in the past when they lost video 
connection with the system. Such bad experiences harmed their confidence in the 
Predators. This lack of confidence prevented them from taking necessary actions to take 
control of the MRPA, and they thought that it would be useless to intervene. Perceptions 





The left column of Table 14 exhibits the original coding of human factors that are 
taken from investigation report and the right column shows our coding from our 
evaluation.  
Table 14.   Comparison of coding of human factors. 
 INVESTIGATION REPORT  OUR EVALUATION 
1 AE102 Checklist Error AE102 Checklist Error,                                        
PC405 Technical/Procedural 
Knowledge 
2 AE102 Checklist Error, AE203 
Necessary Action – Rushed 
AE203 Necessary Action – 
Rushed 




4 PC506 Expectancy PC504 Misperception of 
Operational Conditions 
5 PC506 Expectancy PC506 Expectancy 
6 OP004 Organizational Training 
Issues/Programs 
OP004 Organizational Training 
Issues/Programs 
7 PC101 Inattention PC101 Inattention 
8 OC003 Perceptions of Equipment OC003 Perceptions of Equipment 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Humans may see the same thing, yet each interprets the observation differently 
due to his own perception. These cases help us understand that human decision 
inconsistencies are possible in the rating/evaluating phase; the rater can differently 
observe, understand, and interpret the findings, and thus categorize them differently. We 
observe some differences after comparison of our results and the original investigation 
results.  
These coding and categorizing differences may occur due to many factors. The 
most predominant factors are: lack of detail in the findings to express the right causal 
factors, obscure factors, oversight of coders, and/or inadequate training (Ergai, 2013). 
However, for these cases, we determine two main reasons. First, we do not have any 




there are some similar and overlapping categories in which one category embraces the 
other. For instance, overconfidence and complacency nanocodes are both under psycho-
behavioral factors and their definitions can be confusing (O’Connor, 2008). The 
definition of overconfidence is: “overconfidence is a factor when the individual 
overvalues or overestimates personal capability, the capability of others or the capability 
of aircraft/vehicle or equipment and this creates an unsafe situation” (DOD, 2005, p. 9).   
The definition of the complacency is: “complacency is a factor when the individual’s 
state of reduced conscious attention due to an attitude of overconfidence, under-
motivation, or sense that others have the situation under control leads to an unsafe 
situation” (DOD, 2005, p. 9).   Thus, one may choose either or both of these codes to 
categorize the mishap  
Overall, HFACS provide an in-depth classification opportunity for the raters—so 
much so that it is hard to find any human factor outside of HFACS scope. Sometimes we 
construed the findings disparately and sometimes realized that we added some factors to 
a specific finding. Yet all of our different interpretations and additional opinions were 
inside one of the HFACS categories. Hence, we can say that it can be challenging to 
maintain the standardization in categorizing human factors. At the same time, we can also 
say that HFACS is one of the most useful and reliable tools. Although there are some 
human influences on coding, HFACS best suits categorization and framing the human 








UAVs are widely used in many fields and their popularity is on the rise. As the 
number of operational fields of UAVs increases, so does the potential for mishaps. Our 
first chapter began with the description of the issue and outlined the framework of our 
research. It focused on our objectives for this project and presented the research questions 
that guided our analysis of UAV mishaps using HFACS.   
Even though there is a shift towards automation systems in commercial and 
military applications of aviation, the human role cannot be disregarded. In Chapter II we 
emphasized that reality and clarified what should be understood from UAVs. In that 
chapter we described the elements of UASs and summarized the roles of each element in 
UAV-centered operations. Classification of UAVs and operational fields of each class 
have been addressed as well. The popularity of UAVs is increasing and Chapter II 
provided information about the reasons for that modal shift toward unmanned systems. 
Subsequently, the chapter closed with some fallacies about UAVs. After familiarizing the 
reader with the terminology and overall importance of UAVs, we also examined past 
literature about human causal factors in UAV accidents.  
HFACS systematically describes human elements in commercial, military, and 
general aviation (GA) accidents to achieve better results in the investigations of the 
underlying causal factors in the loss of multi-million dollar projects. In Chapter III we 
presented the HFACS framework and clarified the role of each causal factor and its 
subcategories. This chapter provided the baseline for analysis in later chapters. In Chapter 
IV, we analyzed summaries of 68 UA incidents using the detailed HFAC categories and 
subcategories. The mishaps occurred between 1 October 2010 and 31 August 2011. 
Limited data from the Naval Safety Center in Norfolk, VA, allowed us to use baseline 
percentages to show the most common contributor among human factors. All the data 
gathered from these accidents was analyzed by means of HFACS method to determine 




main factors. As a result, we found that 65 percent of the factors were associated with 
human factors in our sample data and some of them contributed to the mishaps more than 
others.  
In Chapter V we analyzed several case summaries. Although the HFACS is the 
most recent and common mishap analysis system that categorizes human factors, there 
can be human error even in the analysis phase and differences in the interpretation and 
categorization of causal factors. After this study we understood that human interpretation 
problems in the rating/evaluating phase are possible, and necessary precautions should be 
taken to minimize discrepancies among the investigators. 
These analyses demonstrate the importance of showing the human factor in both 
mishaps (as a cause) and the rating/evaluation phase. If military services categorize the 
factors impartially and accurately and if they focus on the main human factors that cause 
the majority of the mishaps, military services may allocate their resources (funding) more 
efficiently and effectively. Thus, military services may save time and money by 
addressing the most relevant and fundamental problems.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
We recommend extending the scope of sample data to get more reliable and 
accurate results from the statistical analysis that we did in Chapter 4. In this study, we 
obtained data from the U.S. Naval Safety Center. The other services also have many 
UAVs and also some of UAs are different type, so the other services recent HFACS 
results also can be compared to see whether results are similar or different because every 
service has their own culture and has their own environment. Although they are using the 
same DOD HFACS frame as guidance (the category and subcategories are the same), the 
evaluations may be different or human causal factor percentage may be different. 
We also recommend increasing the number of case studies and the rater numbers 
that we analyzed in Chapter 5 to get more detailed results and do a more comprehensive 
observation about whether there is a deviation between the raters’ results. This can also 




phase. Furthermore, we have no specific knowledge about the mishaps of unmanned 
aircraft (predators). We analyzed the findings from investigation reports with our 
knowledge and understanding; it is possible to use more experienced personnel who take 
specific HFACS education to categorize findings as raters.    
Our other recommendation is to evaluate and categorize the mishaps by at least 
two different and independent teams and subsequently compare the results, and discuss 
and negotiate on the final factor codes to reach the most accurate result. Also, all team 
members can contribute their expertise and skills to establish the most accurate 
categorization. Taking a second look also may help diminish the discrepancies seen 
during the coding and categorizing.  
In this study, we used U.S. data because UASs in Turkey is still growing, and 
there is no relevant and extended data related to UAV mishaps and hazards. We 
introduced the U.S. HFACS taxonomy to show and prove the existence of the human 
factors in unmanned aircraft accidents and to set an example that also UAV mishaps can 
be investigated by HFACS. It is necessary to be aware of HFACS capabilities and adopt 
this tool in the Turkish Armed Forces for safe flights. 
Finally, our main recommendation is to implement HFACS system for Turkish 
military forces. This system represents an effective tool for all Turkish military services 
to see the most common human causal factors in UASs and provide a database and take 
precautions in advance. In implementing this system, it is useful to determine the trends 
in human performance and system failures in order to act proactively and reduce the 
probability of accidents and hazards. Moreover, it is possible to allocate the limited 
budget more conveniently by knowing the primary and more problematic factors in 
mishaps.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The number of UAV-based operations has been increasing in both commercial 
and military fields in recent years. Accordingly, they are finally regarded as a 




However, the increasing popularity of UAVs as a force multiplier in active combat has 
increased the frequency of UAV accidents dramatically, with no exception in Turkey. 
She has been systematically increasing her UAV inventory with national vehicles. 
However, transforming the force structure from manned to unmanned systems does not 
diminish the human role in operations. Conversely, recent research and our analysis of 
data taken from the Naval Safety Center in Norfolk, VA, show that human error is the 
leading factor (65 percent of the factors causing accidents are human-related according to 
our research) that caused insecure situations in aviation. Focusing on the human element 
while improving high-tech systems will provide more secure and more effective UAV 
flights.  
Research has shown that HFACS is one of the most reliable methods to determine 
human errors in these accidents. It systematically describes human element in the 
commercial, military, and general aviation (GA) accidents to achieve better results in the 
investigations of the underlying causal factors in the loss of multi-million dollar projects. 
HFACS provides mishap investigators with a practical checklist-type tool by which they 
can identify and categorize human causal factors in accidents. It is a comprehensive 
application that can name correctly all kinds of human errors from an individual level to 
organizational level. Currently, HFACS is being widely used by the U.S. Navy, Marine 
Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard to determine the role of humans in aviation 
accidents (Shappell et al., 2000). The Turkish Armed Forces can easily adopt the system 
to analyze aviation accidents for better safety programs and safety measures.  
In addition, HFACS enables organizations to create a database to shape the future 
aviation strategy. All aspects of human factors are defined with a systematic approach 
and results are evaluated by experts. Then occurrence rates of each human causal factor 
are calculated. In this way organizations learn where to invest to increase the quality of 
the unmanned flights. They can easily decide about the training methods of the personnel, 





HFACS provides an in-depth classification opportunity for the raters; however, it 
is not a silver bullet that can solve the problems individually. It is the responsibility of the 
organizations to take the necessary measures for more safe flights in light of HFACS 
findings. In addition, there can be human decision inconsistencies in the rating/evaluating 
phase of the HFACS. The rater can differently observe, understand, and interpret the 
findings and accurately categorize causal factors. These coding and categorizing 
differences can be minimized, if not eliminated, by training programs and can turn 









































APPENDIX A. HFACS TAXONOMY  






• Inadvertent Operation  AE101  
• Checklist not followed correctly  AE102 
• Procedure not followed correctly  AE103 
• Over-controlled/Under-controlled aircraft/vehicle   AE104 
• Breakdown in visual scan  AE105 
• Inadequate Anti-G straining maneuver  AE106  
 
Judgment and Decision-Making Errors 
 
• Risk Assessment – During Operation AE 201  
(e.g., failure of Time Critical ORM) 
• Task Misprioritization AE 202 
• Rushed a necessary action  AE 203 
• Delayed a necessary action AE 204 
• Ignored a Caution/Warning  AE 205 
• Wrong choice of action during an operation   AE 206 (e.g., wrong response to 
an emergency) 
 
Perception Errors (due to) 
 






• Violation - Based on Risk Assessment AV001 (e.g., breaking the rules 
is perceived as the best solution) 
• Widespread/routine violation    AV002 (e.g., habitual deviation from the 
rules that is tolerated by management) 
• Extreme violation-Lack of Discipline (e.g., a violation not condoned by 











• Icing/fog on window restricts vision PE 101 
• Weather conditions restricts vision PE 102 
• Vibration effect vision or balance PE 103 
• Dust/smoke in workspace obstructs vision PE 104 
• Windblast in workspace obstructs vision PE 105 
• Cold stress PE 106 
• Heat stress PE 107 
• Extreme forces limits an individual’s movement PE 108 
• Lights of other vehicle/aircraft interfere with performance PE 109 
• Noise PE 110 
• Brownout (e.g., sand storm)/Whiteout (e.g., snow storm) PE 111  
 
Technological Environment  
 
• Seat and restraint systems problems  PE 201 
• Instrumentation and warning system issues PE 202 
• Visibility restrictions (not weather related) PE 203 
• Controls and switches are inadequate  PE 204 
• Automated system creates an unsafe situation  PE 205 
• Workspace incompatible with operation  PE 206 
• Personal equipment interference  PE 207 








CONDITIONS OF INDIVIDUALS  
Cognitive Factors  
 
• Not paying attention PC 101 
• Fixation (“channelized attention”) PC 102 
• Task over-saturation (e.g., too much information to process) 
PC 103 
• Confusion  PC 104 
• Negative transfer (e.g., using old procedures for a new 
system)  
PC 105 
• Distraction PC 106 
• Geographically lost (Confusion about location)  PC 107 





• Pre-existing personality disorder  PC 201 
• Pre-existing psychological disorder  PC 202 
• Pre-existing psychosocial problem  PC 203 
• Emotional state  PC 204 
• Personality style  PC 205 
• Overconfidence  PC 206 
• Pressing (e.g., pushing self or equipment too hard) PC 207 
• Complacency (e.g., absence of worry)  PC 208 
• Not enough motivation PC 209 
• Misplaced motivation  PC 210 
• More aggressive than necessary PC 211 
• Excessive motivation to succeed (e.g., “do or die”) PC 212 












• Failure of crew/team leadership  PP 101 
• Failure to cross-check/ back-up  PP 102 
• Inadequate task delegation  PP 103 
• Rank/position intimidation  PP 104 
• Lack of assertiveness  PP 105 
• Critical information not communicated  PP 106 
• Standard/proper terminology not used  PP 107 
• Failure to ensure communicated intentions/actions were understood and 
followed (Challenge and Reply)   PP 108 
• Mission planning inadequate  PP 109 
• Mission briefing inadequate  PP 110 
• Failure to re-assess risk and adjust to changing circumstances   PP 111 





• Physical fitness level (inappropriate for mission demands) PP 201 
• Alcohol  PP 202 
• Drugs/over-the-counter medication/supplements (not prescribed)  PP 
203 
• Nutrition/diet  PP 204 
• Inadequate rest (self-imposed)  PP 205 
• Unreported Disqualifying Medical Condition PP 206  
• Inappropriate response due to expectation PC 214 





Adverse Physiological States 
 
• Effects of G forces (e.g., G-LOC)  PC 301 
• Effects of prescribed drugs  PC 302 
• Operational injury/illness  PC 303 
• Sudden incapacitation/unconsciousness (not due to G) PC 
304 
• Pre-existing physical illness/injury  PC 305 
• Physical overexertion  PC 306 
• Fatigue (sleep deprivation)  PC 307 
• Circadian rhythm de-synchronization (e.g., jet lag or shift 
work)   
PC 308 
• Motion sickness  PC 309 
• Trapped gas disorders PC 310 
• Evolved gas disorders (e.g., decompression sickness/bends)  
PC 311 
• Reduced oxygen (hypoxia)  PC 312 
• Hyperventilation (rapid breathing)  PC 313 
• Inadequate adaptation to darkness   PC 314 
• Dehydration  PC 315 
• Physical task over-saturation  PC 316 
 
 Physical/Mental Limitations 
 
• Learning rate limitations PC 401 
• Memory limitations  PC 402 




Biomechanical Limitations)  PC 403 
• Coordination deficiency PC 404 
• Technical or procedural knowledge not retained after 
training 






• Motion illusion  PC 501 
• Turning illusion/balance  PC 502 
• Visual illusion PC 503 
• Misperception of changing environment  PC 504 
• Misinterpreted/misread instrument  PC 505 
• (e.g., misjudge altitude/distance/speed) 
• Inaccurate expectation (e.g., seeing/hearing what is expected 
instead of what is actually there/heard) PC 506 
• Misinterpretation of auditory cues   PC 507 
• Spatial disorientation -- not recognized  PC 508 
• Spatial disorientation -- recognized  PC 509 
• Spatial disorientation – incapacitating  PC 510 














• Command oversight inadequate  SI 001 
• Failed to ensure proper role-modeling   SI 002 
• Failed to provide proper training SI 003 
• Failed to provide appropriate policy/guidance (Supervision-Policy) 
• SI 004 
• Personality conflict with supervisor SI 005 
• Lack of supervisory responses to critical information (Lack of 
Feedback) 
• SI 006 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 
 
• Directed mission beyond personnel capabilities  SP 001 
• Personnel mismatch SP 002 
• Selected individual with lack of current experience  SP 003 
• Selected individual with limited overall experience  SP 004 
• Selected individual with lack of proficiency 
SP 005 
• Performed inadequate risk assessment  SP 006 
• Authorized unnecessary hazard  SP 007 
 
 
Failure to Correct a Known Problem 
 
• Failed to identify/correct risky behavior  SF 001 




• Failure to enforce existing rules (Supervision – Discipline Enforcement)  
SV 001 
• Allowing unwritten policies to become standard  SV 002 
• Directed individual to violate existing regulations  SV 003 

























• Air traffic control resources are deficient  OR 001 
• Airfield resources are deficient  OR 002 
• Operational support facilities/equipment are deficient  OR 003 
• Purchasing or providing poorly designed or unsuitable equipment  OR 004 
• Failure to remove inadequate/worn-out equipment in a timely manner   
OR 005 
• Personnel recruiting and selection policies are inadequate  OR 006 
• Failure to provide adequate manning/staffing resources  OR 007 
• Failure to provide adequate operational informational resources  OR 008 
• Failure to provide adequate funding  OR 009 
Organizational Climate 
 
• Organizational culture (attitude/actions) allows for unsafe mission demand/
pressure  OC 001 
• Inappropriate perception of promotion or evaluation procedures lead to an 
unsafe act  OC 002 
• Organizational over-confidence or under-confidence in equipment  OC 003 
• Impending unit deactivation or mission/equipment change leads to unsafe 
situation OC 004 







• Pace of ops-tempo/workload creates unsafe situation  OP 001 
• Organizational program/policy risks not adequately assessed, 
leading to an unsafe situation  OP 002 
• Provided inadequate procedural guidance or publications  OP 003 
• Organizational (formal) training is inadequate or unavailable  OP 004 
• Flawed doctrine/philosophy leads to unnecessary risks  OP 005 
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